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DRAFT:  PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE  
OR CIRCULATE WITHOUT PERMISSION 
 
 
BIONORMATIVITY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF PARENTHOOD  
 
Katharine K. Baker• 
 
Despite the political intrigue generated by the gay marriage debate, there is a growing 
consensus that family law as a discipline is shifting from a set of rules designed primarily 
to regulate sexual relationships between adults to a set of rules designed to regulate 
parental relationships between adults and children.1  The law has not abandoned its 
regulation of horizontal relationships between adults. It is just that the need for extensive 
regulation has diminished.  Increased reliance on private ordering,2 decreased demand for 
marriage as an institution to take care of women’s economic dependency3 and relaxed 
norms with regard to sexual activity have simply made marriage less primary than it used 
to be.  In contrast, the need for extensive regulation of parenthood has increased.  
 
There is much talk about how the diminished importance of marriage harms children by 
destabilizing homes and breeding competing loyalties,4 but the diminished importance of 
marriage affects children in a more fundamental way.   Without the law of marriage, we 
do not know who parents are. For the most part, the law of marriage has always 
determined the law of parenthood.  More particularly, the marital status of one’s mother 
determined who one’s legal father was, and, indeed, if one had a legal father. This marital 
presumption of parenthood was, for a very long time, essentially irrebuttable.  In 
                                                 
•  Professor and Associate Dean, Chicago-Kent College of Law.  I would like to thank Susan Appleton, 
Brian Bix, Elizabeth Emens and participants at workshops at Emory and Santa Clara University Law 
Schools for helpful comments on previous drafts.   
1 See JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW xiii (2000) 
(“the code of family responsibility is being rewritten in terms of the only ties left – the ones to children”); 
JOHN EEKELAAR, REGULATING DIVORCE (1991) (“Indissoluble marriage has been replaced by the 
indissoluble responsibility of parenthood.”); Martha Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 
239, 245-246 (2001) (“The pressing problems today do not revolve around the marriage connection, but the 
caretaker-dependent relationship”).  A recent annual review from the Family Law Quarterly put it this way: 
“Parentage and Assisted Reproduction Take Center Stage”.  See Linda Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A 
Review of the Year in Family Law: Parentage and Assisted Reproduction Take Center Stage, 39 FAM. L.Q. 
879 (2006)   
2   See Brian Bix, The Public and Private Ordering of Marriage, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 313 
(discussing deference to separation agreements); Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 491, 505 (2005) (“husbands and wives have wide-ranging authority to contract about how to 
distribute their property during marriage and at divorce.”)    
3   See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (alimony statute providing support only to women struck down 
because it was based on the inappropriate presumption that women are economically dependent on their 
spouses and men are not). 
4  See, e.g., WILLIAM GALSTON, A Liberal-Democratic Case for the Two-Parent Family, THE RESPONSIVE 
COMMUNITY 1 (1990-91) (tying various social ills to the absence of two parent families); Andrew Cherlin, 
Lindsay Chase-Lansdale & Christine McRae, Effects of Parental Divorce on Mental Health through the 
Life Course, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 239-49 (1998) (finding more emotional disturbance in children of divorce).  
For a general review of the literature see Paul Amato, Life-Span Adjustment of Children to Their Parents’ 
Divorce, 4 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: CHILDREN AND DIVORCE 143-164 (Spring 1994)   
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England, spouses were forbidden from testifying against the presumption.5  The strictness 
of that procedural rule dissipated over time, but the substantive problem of proving 
paternity did not.  Until very recently, the marital presumption made it exceedingly 
difficult to establish paternity in anyone other than the husband, so marriage remained the 
primary arbiter of parenthood.  In the last 20 years, two factors have combined to 
severely compromise the importance of the marital presumption.  First, reliable genetic 
testing makes it very easy to overcome the marital presumption of paternity.  Second, the 
growing number of children born to unwed mothers renders the marital presumption 
irrelevant for a significant portion of our population.6  
 
Many people may presume that these two factors have allowed “biological truth,” i.e. 
genetic connection, to replace marriage as the primary legal arbiter of parenthood.    
Indeed, some scholars have suggested that biological truth is actually what the marital 
regime aimed for all along. It was “designed to ensure that children would be raised by 
their genetic parents,”7 but because there was no way of determining biological 
connection, the system used marriage as a proxy.  Still, the willingness of the legal 
system to actually impose parental status based on anything other than marriage is 
relatively recent8 and the ability of a legal regime to enforce systematically a regime of 
biological parenthood is extremely recent.9  It has only been in the last 20 years that 
genetic testing procedures have been reliable enough to determine biological parentage.10 
 
Perhaps we should consider ourselves lucky that the remarkable explosion in genetic 
science arrived just in time to fill the void left by the decreased significance of marriage.  
Without marriage, we are in desperate need of a system to determine parenthood.  
Biology, which for years has played a kind of background role, can now play the 
exclusive role.   But do we want it to? 
 
Given where we are, at the demise of the marital regime and the potential rise of the 
biological one, it seems appropriate to ask some fundamental questions about why the 
                                                 
5   Neither husband nor wife could testify to non-access, unless the husband was “beyond the four seas” of 
England.  Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 291, 98 Eng. Rep, 1257 (1977).  
 6 The Center for Disease Control reports that 35.8% of all births were to unmarried women in 2004.  CDC, 
National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 55 no. 1, Sept. 29, 2006.    The rate of birth unmarried women has 
risen particularly fast for older women.  The Atlantic Monthly reports that the number of children born to 
unmarried women over age 30 rose by 290 percent from 1980 to 2002. (Lori Gottlieb, The XY Files, THE 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY 142, Sept. 2005.  
7 June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind?: Redefining the Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of 
Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1024 (2003). 
8  The first legal paternity proceedings were introduced in England in 1565.  See infra 24-25.    
9   One cannot base legal status on a condition that is impossible to determine with any real accuracy.  Until 
the advent of DNA testing, it was simply impossible to really know who the genetic father was.  See David 
L . Faigman et al.  Modern Scientific Evidence:  The Law and Science of Expert Testimony § 19-1.4 
(1997) (reliable genetic testing now allows us to determine paternity in a way that HLA and blood group 
testing never could).        
10 For purposes of this article, the terms genetic parenthood and biological parenthood have the same 
technical meaning, to wit, a parent-child relationship based on the fact that the parent’s genetic material is 
present in the child.  I have chosen not to simply replace the term “biological” with “genetic” because the 
two terms retain different social meanings.  The term “biological” tends to connote an organic, natural 
process of family formation, whereas the term “genetic” tends to connote the opposite.  
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law should care about biological parenthood.   This essay attempts to do that by exploring 
the benefits and byproducts of a parental regime based on biology.  It suggests that what 
makes a biological, or what I will label “bionormative,” regime attractive to many is not 
so much the importance of the genetic connection between parent and child, but is instead 
the way in which a bionormative regime constructs parenthood as  private (meaning that 
the state has no legitimate interest in regulating, but also no requirement to finance, 
parenthood), exclusive (meaning one’s parental status may not be usurped by anyone 
else), and binary (meaning there are two and only two parents).11   These ancillary 
qualities of bionormativity may have as much to do with our attraction to biology as does 
biology itself.   As technology allows us to both ascertain and tinker with genetic 
connection, and as the traditional nuclear family gives way to a myriad of other family 
structures, it is critically important that we think about not only the importance of 
biological connection, but also the other aspects of bionormativity that make it appealing.  
 
The article proceeds as follows. Part I explains why, despite what appears to be common 
consensus in favor of bionormativity,12 a bionormative regime is not historically, 
biologically or morally compelled.   Part II then starts to unpack the appeal of 
bionormativity for three important constituencies, the state, parents and children.  Part 
IIA explores the state interest.  Because a biologically based system appears to make 
parenthood a pre or extra legal fact, a liberal state is attracted to bionormativity for 
financial and administrative reasons.13   Part IIB analyzes parents’ interests in 
bionormativity and suggests that parents’ interests parallels the state’s.  While the state is 
attracted to a regime that makes parental obligation a function of pre or extra legal fact, 
parents are attracted to a  regime that makes parental rights a function of pre or extra 
legal fact.  As a matter of biology, one either is a parent of “x” or one is not and that fact 
is forever.  In a bionormative world, biological parents do not have to worry about 
significant state regulation of parenthood and they do not have to worry about someone 
else usurping their exclusive status as parents.  Both parents and the state are also 
attracted to the binary qualities of bionormativity.  Because biological parenthood is 
always binary, parenthood is always conceptualized as binary and that conceptualization 
allows both the state and parents to balance the need to provide for children with the 
desire to limit the class of people entitled to parent any one child.  Part IIC analyzes 
                                                 
11  There is overlap, though not identity, between the concepts of exclusive and binary parenthood.  For 
short hand purposes, one can think of a non-exclusive regime as one that incorporates more than two 
parents, while a non-binary regime is a regime that allows only one.  This is a little misleading though 
because an exclusive regime could allow one (and only one) parent and a non-binary regime could allow 
for more than two parents.  
12  Martha Minnow writes there is “a remarkable degree of consensus . . . [that]. . [p]eople who produce 
children should provide for their support.”  MARTHA MINNOW, How Should We Think About Child Support 
Obligations?, in FATHERS UNDER FIRE 302 (Irwin Garfinkel ed., 2001).  
13 A discussion of the various definitions and qualifications for the terms “liberalism” or “liberal state”  is 
well beyond the scope of this essay.   For the purposes of this article, I use the term “liberal state” only to 
suggest a state that perceives itself as ideally serving a limited role of  “provid[ing] a framework of rules 
and guidelines designed to enable society very largely to run itself. “ JOSE HARRIS, Society and the State in 
Twentieth-Century Britain, in THE CAMBRIDGE SOCIAL HISTORY OF BRITAIN, 1750-1950, 67 
(F.M.L.Thompson ed., 1990).   See generally, JULIA O’CONNOR, ANN SHOLA ORLOFF & SHEILA SHAVER, 
STATES, MARKETS, FAMILIES: GENDER, LIBERALISM, AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, GREAT 
BRITAIN, AND THE UNITED STATES 3 (1999).   
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children’s interests in bionormativity. It suggests that children share some interests in the 
private and exclusive qualities of bionormativity, though possibly not an interest in its 
binary nature.  More important, children, unlike the state and parents, may have a 
compelling interest in the biological aspect of bionormativity, though the evidence in this 
regard is not conclusive.   
 
Part III proceeds to evaluate how the core attributes of bionormativity, privacy, 
exclusiveness, binariness and biology are threatened by contemporary parenting 
practices.  The extent of child poverty, the rejection of (even the appearance of) life-time 
monogamy and the use of donated gametes all work to destabilize a bionormative regime.  
In short, there are many people who now have an interest in making parenthood less 
private, less exclusive, less binary and/or less biological.  The law is often receptive to 
their claims.  Part III concludes with some queries about which attributes of 
bionormativity may be most vulnerable and what the consequences of jettisoning them 
would be.   Part IV, the conclusion, makes two points.  First, it is clear that the most 
disruptive force to the defining features of biological parenthood is not human 
manipulation of the biological reproductive process, but adult living patterns that expose  
children  to many  parent-like figures.  Because contemporary adult relationships are less 
likely to be permanently binary and exclusive, so is parenthood.14   When parenthood 
becomes less binary and exclusive, it becomes less private and less biological as well.  
The more the legal system feels compelled to recognize functional parent relationships, 
the greater the erosion of all of the core features of bionormativity.  Second, a regime in 
which the legal system does recognize multiple parental relationships is likely to be a 
regime in which we see not only more than two parents, but different degrees of 
parenthood, greater and lesser parenthood.  To the extent that the law already creates 
greater and lesser forms of parenthood at divorce, it is controversial. The analysis here 
suggests that recognizing degrees of parenthood may be an inevitable byproduct of a 
system that rejects bionormativity.    
 
This essay does not endorse or reject biological parenting or any of its core qualities.  It 
does suggest that it is important to separate out different aspects of bionormativity in 
order to balance the competing priorities that inform a conceptualization of parenthood.  
Given the decreased importance of marriage and the increased ability to perfect a 
biological system, we have to come to terms with what we really care about. There is 
much to be said in favor of a regime that is private, exclusive, binary and biological.  If 
we cannot or do not want to hold on to all of these qualities of parenthood, we may at 
least want to hold on to some.  Doing so will require an articulation of normative 
commitments and priorities.  These normative commitments will, in turn, define the 
contours of parenthood in the coming century.  
 
I. The History, Nature and Morality of Bionormativity 
 
A.  History 
 
                                                 
14 The non-binary and non-exclusive nature of adult relationships has everything to do, of course, with the 
decreased ubiquity of permanent marriage.  
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As suggested, biology has not always played a primary role in determining parentage.  
Under Roman Law, the parentage of children born to married women (or women in 
recognized concubinage relationships) was a function of who the state recognized as their 
mothers’ partner, but children born to unmarried mothers were filius nullius, or children 
of no one.15  The illegitimate children of royalty or other rich men were often provided 
for, but such care was up to the whim of the biological father.16  Women who could not 
depend on this kind of largesse often abandoned their babies so that others could care for 
them.17  As John Eekelar has noted, abandonment was an “informal method of 
transferring responsibility for the care of children from parents to others in the 
community.”18   Abandonment was commonplace for centuries, yet none of Ancient, 
early Christian or later European society attempted to impose serious sanctions on the 
practice.19 
 
The idea of compelling a biological father to support his children originated in Europe in 
1234, when Pope Clement III issued an edict declaring that fathers had a duty to support 
their children, regardless of whether the children were born to a marriage.20   Ecclesiastic 
courts, in local parishes, enforced this edict by entertaining suits to establish paternity and 
imposing support obligations.21   The Church’s primary motivation for imposing the 
obligation may have been financial.  Responsibility for children who were not provided 
for privately fell to individual parishes.22     
 
By the 16th century, with increased urbanization, more clustered poverty and decreasing 
canonical influence, secular governments throughout Europe began to assume more 
responsibility for the poor.23  Children born to unmarried mothers were usually poor.   
Accordingly, in 1576, as part of the Poor Laws, the British Parliament adopted the first 
                                                 
15 Richard Helmholz, Support Orders, Church Courts, and the Rule of Filius Nullius: A Reassessment of 
the Common Law, 63 VA. L. REV. 431, 435 (1977) (Roman law required biological fathers to support 
children born to the recognized form of Roman concubinage). 
16 See, for instance, the story of how Charles II provided for his numerous illegitimate children, described 
in JENNY TEICHMAN, ILLEGITIMACY: AN EXAMINATION OF BASTARDY 57-58 (1982). 
17  John Boswell has documented how parents of all social standing abandoned children throughout Europe 
from antiquity through the middle ages. He estimates that 20-40% of Roman children were abandoned.  
JOHN BOSWELL, THE KINDNESS OF STRANGERS 428 (1988).  
18  John Eekelaar, Are Parents Morally Obliged to Care for Their Children? 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
340, 341 (1991).  
19   Chistian writers sometimes assailed the irresponsible sexuality that led to the abandonment, but they did 
not condemn the abandonment itself.  See Boswell, supra note 17 at 429-430. 
20 Id. at 434 
21   The standards for proof appeared to be more lax in medieval England than they were in the modern 
United States, Id. at 440, but the support amounts ordered also appear to have been quite modest.  Also 
interesting is the fact that, once established, the claims were reciprocal, children were responsible for the 
aged parents just as parents were responsible for their dependent children.  Id. at 435. 
22 LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX, AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND, 1500-1800 520 (1977). The 
legitimacy and efficacy of these courts may well have been aided by the small close-knit communities in 
which they operated.  The range of potential defendants was limited as was the ability of a defendant to 
evade the ecclesiastical court’s judgment.  Still, the number of claims brought for enforcement of existing 
orders suggest that then, as now, it is difficult to get non-marital fathers to pay support on a consistent 
basis.  See Helmholz, supra note at 445. 
23 See TEICHMAN, supra note 16 at 60.  
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secular paternity suit.24    These first paternity actions were brought by Justices of the 
Peace to seek reimbursement from the biological fathers of children who were receiving 
support from the state.25  Both the Church and Parliament emphasized the immorality of 
extra-marital sex when imposing a duty of support on unwed fathers and legislation 
regarding paternal duties to support remained deeply imbued with moral judgments about 
extra-marital sex until the late 17th and early 18th centuries.26  Indeed, many 
commentators argued that the obligation to support was rooted in the illicit sexual 
activity, not paternity itself.27  This line of argument augured in favor of holding multiple 
men responsible for support if it could be established that all had intercourse with the 
mother at a time that could have produced a child.28    
 
By the 18th century, the increasing secularization of European societies tended to shift 
legislative concern toward economic conditions of the child, not the immorality of its 
conception.29  It was not until 1845 though, that unwed mothers (as opposed to the state) 
in England acquired the right to sue a biological father for support.30  Only at this point 
did the secular law of England fully accept the idea that biological paternity gave rise to 
an obligation for reasons having nothing to do with state expenditures or immoral activity 
or marriage.   
 
The degree to which other countries made biological fathers responsible varied widely.  
In France, in the 17th and 18th centuries, an unmarried man could be found responsible for 
a child born to an unmarried woman, but a married man could not be sued in paternity.31  
By the mid-nineteenth century, section 340 of the Napoleonic Code, which applied to 
vast portions of Europe, eliminated all paternity actions and forbade any tracing of 
paternity.32  The Dutch adopted this prohibition as well.33  The tradition among Germanic 
tribes (who may not have adopted the Napoleonic Code) was to impose paternity only if 
the biological mother and father were of equal class or race.34 
 
In this country, until approximately 40 years ago, the nature and even existence of a 
biological parent’s duty to support his children depended on wildly inconsistent state 
                                                 
24   Lawrence P. Hampton, Overview, in DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS § 1.02(1)-(3) (2004).    
25  Id.  
26 Stone, supra note 22. 
27 J. E. Scholtens, Maintenance of Illegitimate Children and the Exceptio Plurium Concubentium, 72 S. 
AFR. L. J. 144, 150-51 (1955).  
28 Id.  The idea of holding all men who slept with the mother responsible is practiced in modern day India 
and in various tribes throughout South America.  See infra text accompanying notes  69-70.  
29 Stone, supra note at 634-35. 
30  Hampton, supra note 24  at § 1.02(1) – (3).   Prior to this, it was up to individual parishes whether to 
distribute any of the proceeds of their collection to the mother for care of the child.  See TEICHMAN, supra 
note 16 at 64.  
31 See Teichman, supra note 16  at 154.  The children of the married putative fathers who could not be sued 
for support were cared for in foundling homes run by religious orders. Id  The bar prohibiting the 
establishment of paternity in a married man also existed in modern, Islamic Turkey.  BELMA BAYAR, 
TURKEY: LAW ON LEGITIMACY 16 (1981).   
32 See. Scholtens, supra note 27 at  148-149.  
33 Id.  
34 TEICHMAN, supra note 15 at 55.  
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law.35  Some states imposed no obligation on unwed biological fathers;36 some states let 
judges impose discretionary obligations on unwed fathers;37 other states mandated that 
genetic fathers provide fixed monthly amounts of support  for illegitimate children; 38  
still other states made the unwed biological parent duty to support equivalent to that of a 
divorced parent.39  For a long while states also expressed a variety of views regarding the 
reason for the parental obligation: for some it was punishment for extramarital sex, for 
some it was punishment for refusing to marry the mother and for some it was simply a 
liability owed to the child.40   
 
This haphazard and unequal treatment of biological parenthood might have continued in 
this country were it not for the federalization of social welfare benefits.  Because most 
American 20th century social welfare programs, many of which were targeted to help 
poor children, drew on federal funds, the federal government acquired a keen interest in 
paternity law.  Like the British Poor Laws of 1576, the United States Federal Child 
Support Act of 1984 sought to recoup funds that the government was paying out to 
support the children of unmarried fathers.41   It sought to do this by demanding more 
comprehensive enforcement of biologically based paternity laws.  The 1984 Child 
Support Amendments required all states to allow children to sue their biological father 
for paternity until the child’s eighteenth birthday and to promulgate child support 
guidelines that imposed child support payments commensurate with a biological parent’s 
income.42  Thus, the 20th century American legislation made the obligation to support a 
child a function of a parent’s ability to pay and it imposed that obligation regardless of 
the child’s extant economic situation.  These rules remain in place today.   
 
B. Nature and Evolutionary Biology 
 
Perhaps aware that the non-ecclesiastical justifications for paternity laws have always 
been somewhat opaque, Blackstone, as early as 1688, felt the need to clarify why 
biological fathers should be financially responsible for their children.  He wrote:  
  
 
The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children, is a principle 
of natural law; an obligation laid on them not only by nature itself, but by their 
own proper act, in bringing them into the world . . . . By begetting them, 
therefore, they have entered into a voluntary obligation to endeavor, as fare as in 
                                                 
35  HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 22-25 (1971).  
36   Idaho did not impose a support duty on the father of an illegitimate child until 1969, Id. Stat. Ann.  § 7-
1101 et seq.;  It was not until 1973 that the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Texas’ law imposing a support 
liability on parents of legitimate children but not on parents of illegitimate children, Gomez v. Perez, 409 
U.S. 535 (1973).    
37   KRAUSE, supra note 35 at 23. 
38  See e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48-7-4 (1966). 
39  KRAUSE, supra note 35 at 23.  
40 For a discussion see State v. M., 233 A.2d  65, 67 (9 N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967) 
41 42 U.S.C. § 600 et seq. (2000). 
42 Id.  
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them lies, that the life which they have bestowed shall be supported and 
preserved.43 
 
In this excerpt, Blackstone identifies two potential sources of parental obligation: nature 
and causality.  Neither explanation survives scrutiny. 
  
What Blackstone put in terms of natural law, contemporaries might well put in terms of 
evolutionary biology.  It is natural for biological parents to support their children because 
biological parents are the ones most likely to be willing to support their offspring.  
Science tells us that the genes that survive are the genes best able to reproduce 
themselves and the best way to ensure reproduction is to support the bodies that contain 
the genes.  That, in a much simplified form, is the core tenet of modern evolutionary 
biology.44  Biological parents will support their children because by supporting them they 
will ensure their own genes’ survival.  Thus, nature seems to ensure responsible 
biological parenthood.    
 
This is a neat, parsimonious explanation, but if nature really ensured responsible 
biological parenthood, neither Pope Clement in the 13th century, nor the British 
Parliament in the 16th century, nor the U.S.Congress in the 20th century  would  have 
worried about mandating biological parenthood.  Quite obviously, we have mandatory 
child support laws precisely because biological parents often do not support their 
children.  The familiar failure of some biological parents to support their children does 
not render the evolutionary evidence irrelevant, however. Indeed, evolutionary biology 
can help explain why some biological parents might not support their children.  In doing 
it so it also raises questions about the extent to which the law should impose an obligation 
on biological parents who do not accept it voluntarily.  
  
If the first tenet of evolutionary biology is that the genes that survive are the ones that 
compel us to behave in ways that maximize the likelihood of survival, the second tenet of 
evolutionary biology may well be that men and women are different.  They are (on 
average) different -- in their sexual behavior, in their mating requirements, in their 
parenting patterns, in their aggression and along numerous other axes -- for one simple 
reason: the female gamete is much bigger than the male gamete and this larger size 
means that females contribute disproportionately to the reproductive process. 45   The 
bigger female gamete size allows the female to contribute the food reserves that the 
fertilized egg needs to grow, but it also keeps the female from producing the number of 
(smaller) gametes that a male can produce.  This means that a female has to care more 
about any one gamete than does a male.   
 
Moreover, because human beings are fertilized and gestated inside the female, mothers 
are biologically compelled to contribute more to each fertilized egg.  Indeed, after 
                                                 
43  WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 435 (1765).   
44   See generally, RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976); MATT RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN, SEX, 
AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE (1993); RICHARD WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL (1994).  
45 Richard Dawkins writes that “it is possible to interpret all the other differences between the sexes as 
stemming from this one difference.”  DAWKINS, supra note 45 at 141. 
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fertilization and before birth, with the exception of possible male donations of food to the 
mother, the mother is the only one who invests in the reproductive process, and her 
investment is enormous.46  Evolutionary biology tells us that disproportionate female 
investment, pre-birth, coupled with the fact that  (until the last 20 years) a male could 
never be absolutely sure that a child born to his sexual partner actually had his genetic 
material, make women, on average,  invest much more in born children than do men.47  
This lopsided investment pattern works well for men because  “[i]f one parent can get 
away with investing less than his or her fair share of costly resources in each child . . . he 
will be better off, since he will have more to spend on other children by other sexual 
partners, and so propagate more of his genes.”48   A gene that routinely encouraged a 
parent to abandon all of his young might not survive as well because none of his 
offspring would get the benefit of his continued investment, but a reproductive strategy 
that involved some support of some of his children, and meager support of others 
(particularly if those others might be supported adequately by the mother or another 
male) might be very successful.  Indeed, Richard Dawkins predicted exactly that kind of 
behavior.49  In short, a study of nature reveals that failing to support (at least some of) 
one’s children is perfectly natural.50  
  
The fact that biology suggests that many men will not voluntarily support their young 
does not mean that the law should not try to compel them to do so.  Evolutionary biology 
suggests that many people are inclined to many pernicious behaviors (rape, marital 
exploitation, child abuse), that the law need not condone.51   Neither, however, do the 
insights from evolutionary biology suggest that the law should compel biological parents 
to contribute to the welfare of their children if the parents do not want to.  What nature, or 
biology, tells us is that if we are to compel unwilling parents to support their children we 
may well be compelling them to do something that is contrary to their reproductive 
interests.  The law can choose to do that, but it should only choose to do that if in so 
doing it is fulfilling a normative agenda.52   Thus, while Blackstone may have thought 
                                                 
46     See Eileen McDonough, My Body, My Consent: Securing the Constitutional Right to Abortion 
Funding, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1057, 1073-74 (1999) (describing the severe physical burdens of pregnancy). 
47  See generally ROBERT TRIVERS, Parental Investment and Sexual Selection in SEXUAL SELECTION AND 
THE DESCENT OF MAN 136, 139 (Bernard Campbell ed., 1972)  
48 DAWKINS, supra note 44 at 140.  
49   Dawkins made this prediction using game theory and arbitrary numbers, but his premise remains strong 
with most numbers. In any given population, there are likely to be some proportion of men, or some 
propensity in most men, to produce some children that they do not support. Id. At 151-154 
50  The history of abandonment, discussed briefly earlier, also suggests that failing to support some of one’s 
biological issue is common enough to be considered natural.  
51  For a discussion of how the law might deal with the insights of evolutionary biology for rape and 
exploitation within marriage see Katharine K. Baker, Biology for Feminists, 75 CHI-KENT L. REV. 805 
(2000).   For a discussion of the tendency of step-parents to abuse children, see Margo Wilson & Martin 
Daly, Risk of Maltreatment of Children Living with Stepparents, in  CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT:  
BIOSOCIAL DIMENSIONS 215, 218-19 (Richard J. Gelles & Jane B. Lancaster eds., 1987).  
52 As I have previously argued, biology can reveal how brutal life looks like without normative convictions, 
but it cannot tell us what our normative convictions are or should be.  See Baker, supra note 51 at 806 
(“[b]y laying bare the harsh reality of nature, [biology can] force[] us to embrace our normative 
convictions”).  See also DAWKINS, supra note 44 at 3  (“a society based simply on the gene’s law of 
universal ruthless selfishness would be a very nasty society in which to live.”)  
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that nature answered the question of who should support children, all nature does is tell 
us that some biological parents will and some biological parents will not.      
  
C.  Causation and Morality 
 
This brings us to the second reason Blackstone gave for why biological parents should 
support their children – causation.  To many, this may also seem like an obvious, moral 
justification for holding biological parents responsible.53  One is responsible for that 
which one creates.  Recent philosophical inquiries into this simple reasoning suggests 
that a system of bionormativity is far from logically inevitable, however.   Though their 
reasoning differs, the scholars who have analyzed whether causation serves as an 
adequate justification for holding biological fathers responsible for child support 
uniformly find that it does not.  
 
In her article on this subject, British feminist scholar Sally Sheldon highlights what most 
legal philosophers accept as a matter of course, “factual causation does not fix legal or 
ethical duties without something more.”54  She then discusses what Blackstone and others 
suggest as the “something more”  --  the voluntary act of intercourse on the biological 
parents’ part.  Because a woman and man voluntarily have sex, and that sex could result 
in a pregnancy, that woman and man are responsible for the child.  Voluntariness does 
not do the work that one would need it to in order to impose the obligation either though.  
Given that in most Western societies the decision to carry a pregnancy to term is vested 
solely in the woman,55 the voluntary decision to engage in sex seems at least one step 
removed from the critical decision of whether to bring a child into the world.56  The 
woman carrying the fetus, who has the exclusive right to terminate the pregnancy or not, 
is the much better proximate cause of the child’s birth.57   
 
Sheldon focuses on abortion, but contemporary adoption law places a comparable degree 
of control in the mother’s hands.  If the father wants to relinquish the child for adoption 
and the mother does not, the child is not surrendered and the biological father is still 
responsible for child support.  In this sense, a mother is able to cause a father’s on-going 
responsibility, by refusing to let him relinquish it.   He is not able to do the same thing.   
                                                 
53  Carbone and Cahn, supra note 7 at 1025; Minnow, supra note  12.   
54  Sally Sheldon, Unwilling Fathers and Abortion:  Terminating Men’s Child Support Obligations?, 66 
MODERN  L. REV. 175, 181 (2003), citing H.L.A. HART AND A.M. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 
(1959).   
55 While it is true that many women in the United States have difficulty securing access to or finances for 
abortions, no state makes a man’s obligation to support his biological children dependent on whether the 
mother had the opportunity to terminate the pregnancy. 
56  In this country, voluntariness could fail for another reason.  Men who are legally incapable of voluntarily 
consenting to sex (because they are too young) are held responsible for child support.  See County of San 
Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (Ct. App. 1996); State ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 
P.2d 1273 (Kan. 1993); Mercer County Dep’t of Soc. Serv. v. Alf M., 589 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (N.Y. Fam. 
Ct. 1992).   
57   This is not the forum to go into all of Sheldon’s arguments, but she does examine and reject the claims 
that not all women feel that abortion is a choice available to them and that continuing a pregnancy is a 
unique, fundamental right so that a decision to continue it cannot be seen as a cause of anything.   See 
Sheldon, supra note 54 at 181-187.  
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If the mother wants to put the child up for adoption and the father does not, she can 
simply “lose” the biological father, by running away from him, by not telling him that she 
is pregnant or by saying the biological father is someone else.  These strategies may not 
be completely legal, but neither are they uncommon.58  He has a very difficult time 
forcing her to accept parenthood.  The mother simply has much more control over 
whether and in what circumstances the child can come to be.  Again, this makes her far 
more responsible for causing the child and its dependency.   
 
Sheldon goes on to argue that even if the decision as to whether to bear the child  were 
equally shared, factual causation with an element of voluntariness could not be all that is 
necessary to impute responsibility or parents would be responsible for their dependent 
adult children also.  Most societies accept collective responsibility for dependent adults in 
a way they do not for dependent children and the answer as to why does not have to do 
with voluntary causation.59  
 
A British philosopher, John Eekelaar, asks a question akin to Sheldon’s in his article, 
“Are Parents Morally Obliged to Care for their Children?”  He concludes maybe.60   
What any one individual’s duty to others is will depend on the circumstances in which 
one finds oneself and others.61 If a man is drowning while a mother and a baby sit on an 
adjacent beach, we do not say that the drowning man is dependent on the baby. He 
depends on the mother because she has the ability to help him. And, if there were another 
adult on the beach, we would probably say that the drowning man is dependent on the 
                                                 
58   Raquel X is probably the most famous example of the mother not being able to proceed with the 
adoption over the father’s wishes, In the Matter of Raquel Marie X, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1990) (father has 
right to block adoption of newborn). However, if the mother in that case had managed to keep the 
pregnancy hidden from the father, or blocked him out of the baby’s life for a sufficient period of time, there 
would be little the father could have done.  The mother in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983)  refused 
to let the father see the child and then kept the child from him for over a year before wanting to have the 
child adopted by someone else.  The Supreme Court found that the father did not have a sufficiently strong 
constitutional interest in being the father because he had not developed a sufficiently strong relationship 
with the child.  The mother in  In Re: Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993) knowingly named 
the wrong man on the original adoption papers and the mother in the In Re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 
1995) ran away from the father.  These later two cases became infamous only after the mothers recanted 
and decided they wanted their children (and their children’s father) back, but without a mother’s 
subsequent change of heart, it is very hard for a biological father to know enough about the existence of his 
child to assume parental responsibility.  
59  Sheldon, supra note 54 at 190. Sheldon also points out that the voluntary creation of dependency does 
not automatically lead to financial responsibility.  Doctors and good Samaritans create needy people by 
saving those who would have otherwise died and are subsequently unable to live an independent life.   
Sheldon suggests that the “voluntary creation of need is only convincing as a basis for financial liability, 
when such need results from harm to third parties.”  Id. at 189.  If one creates a need that the affected 
(needy) person would not have chosen, given is or her alternatives, then one is responsible.  To hold 
biological parents responsible under this rationale one would need to find that the needy children created by 
their biological parents would rather not have been born.  This is not a novel argument necessarily, but it is 
certainly a controversial one. 
60  Eekelaar, supra note 18.  
61  See Jeffrey Bluestein, Child Rearing and Family Interests in HAVING CHILDREN 115, 116 (O’Neill & 
Ruddick eds., 1979  (“The biological fact that parents have caused their children to exist is not itself 
morally decisive. The moral issue is not who caused the child to exist but who is to bear primary 
responsibility for preventing harm or suffering that might come to this needy being.”) 
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second adult, because we would assume that the mother needed to care for the baby.  
Comparably, we do not say that an orphan is dependent on her biological parents  -- they 
are not there; she must depend on someone else.  Who she depends on will depend on the 
social networks available, just as who the drowning man depends on will depend on the 
social networks available.  The moral duty toward specific children therefore “frequently 
fall[s] primarily [on parents] for no other reason than their physical proximity to their 
children.”62    That physical proximity can vary widely across cultures, however.   
Different cultures assign responsibilities for providing for children (and the elderly) 
differently.63   
 
Eekelaar is a scholar of law and philosophy, but a brief foray into the anthropological 
literature strongly bolsters his argument. As has been known for decades, many cultures 
employ notions of both social fathers and biological fathers.64  Social fathers are often the 
ones who assume the primary responsibility for providing for the child.  This custom is 
particularly widespread in Africa, where fosterage (sending one’s children to be raised by 
others) is common.  In Botswana, the role of social father is often assumed by a mother’s 
brother or a mother’s subsequent husband.  In either case, the biological father is not held 
responsible for support of the child.65 The Baatombu society of North Benin encourages 
all severance of biological ties so that “an individual expresses shame when claiming 
ownership over his biological children.”66   
 
Other cultural practices include sexual and marital arrangements in which it is very 
difficult for anyone to determine biological paternity.  One polyandrous culture in West 
India assigns paternity by lot, by mother’s choice or by birth order of the fathers, 
depending on the situation.67   Children in this community are often acknowledged by 
many fathers, but only one mother.68  The idea of multiple paternity is also common 
throughout the tribal regions of South America.  These cultures believe that more than 
one man’s genetic connection is necessary for conception.   A child’s fathers include 
every man that has had intercourse with the mother around the time of conception and all 
of a child’s fathers help provide for the child. 69 
 
                                                 
62  Eekelaar, supra note 18 at 351.   
63   For an examination of the different legal approaches to filial responsibility laws, see generally, Seymour 
Moskowitz, Adult Children and Indigent Parents: Intergenerational Responsibilities in International 
Perspective, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 402 (2002) (discussing different state statutes and national laws that require 
children to provide for their parents) 
64   ALFRED RADCLIFFE-BROWN and CYRIL DARYLL FORDE, AFRICAN SYSTEMS OF KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE  
(1950).  
65   Nicholas Townsend, Men, Migration and Households in Botswana, 23 J. OF S. AFRICAN STUD. (1997).  
66   Erdmut Alber, Denying Biological Parenthood: Fosterage in N. Benin, 68 ETHOS 487.   
67   Geraald Berreman, 2 AMERICAN ETHNOLOGIST 127-1278 (1975).   The marital arrangements usually 
involve one woman marrying several brothers, but sometimes there are several mothers marrying several 
brothers.  The children of these arrangements are acknowledged by all of the fathers, but not necessarily by 
all of the mothers.  
68  Id.  
69 This practice embodies the approach suggested in the 19th century when the paternity obligation was seen 
more as a punishment for extramarital sex.  See Scholtens, supra note 27 at 150-51. 
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The historical and cultural evidence thus easily sustains Eekelaar’s ethical conclusion that 
“the duty to care for children is embedded in the conjunction of two sources.  One is the a 
priori duty to promote human flourishing . . . The other is derivative from the society 
itself, for social practice determines the application of that duty within its structure.” 70  
He concludes that parents are obligated to support their children not because they are 
biologically related, but because our society says that biological parents should support 
their children.   He finds no ethical justification in the biological connection itself.   
 
Tackling the issue of parental duties to support children in this country, family law 
scholar Scott Altman finds a justification for current child support laws, but not in any of 
the traditional places.  Like Sheldon and Eekelar, Altman quickly rejects causation as a 
valid basis of support because “although causation is relevant to legal and moral duties, it 
is neither necessary nor sufficient for a duty, and is generally an unappealing principle for 
distribution.”71  Altman argues that causation serves as a necessary precursor to duty 
usually only when coupled with some other factor, like being especially well-suited to 
meet a need, benefiting from the conditions that created the need, or committing a wrong 
in the creation of a need. Some parents fall into these categories, but not all do.   
 
Most biological parents may be particularly well-suited to meet the dependency needs of 
their children, but that does not mean that a moral duty to support exists in those parents 
who are not.  Biological parents who engaged in heterosexual sex may also have derived 
some benefit from creating the needy child, but, as Altman argues, the passing joy of 
sexual pleasure is awfully small compared to the very large financial liability of child 
support.  Moreover, it is not appropriate to assume that all reproductive acts involve 
sexual pleasure, even for men.  Finally, while traditional paternity law was very much 
rooted in the idea that a wrong had been committed in the creation of the need,72 
extramarital sex is no longer seen as a valid basis for punishment. Thus it is not clear that 
there is “another factor” that makes the causation rationale persuasive. 
 
Altman discusses and dismisses a number of other justifications for placing the child 
support burden on parents, including the idea that child support represents the pre-
payment of a debt,73 or meets policy goals of gender equality,74and population control.75  
His ultimate rationale for our child support system is not rooted in any of these ideas, but 
instead reflects tort-like damages for what Altman identifies as two parental wrongs (i) 
failing to demonstrate love for a child and (ii) failing to maintain a sustainable  
                                                 
70  Eekelaar supra note 19 at 351.  See also Bluestein, supra note 61 at 117 (“biological parents may be 
responsible for children simply because they are in the best position to help”) 
71  Scott Altman, A Theory of Child Support, 17 INTL. J. OF L. POL. & THE FAM. 173,  177 (2003) . 
72   “Filiation statutes are generally considered to represent an exercise of the police power for the primary 
purposes of denouncing the misconduct involved, punishing the offender or shifting the burden of support 
from society to the child’s natural parent.”  State v. M., 233 A.2d 65, 67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div 1967) 
73 Altman, supra note 71 at 181-182 (pay so that kids will pay for you, but why “seek such a limited and 
financially random insurance pool” Public support does the job better.)   
74  Id. at  182-183 men should pay because women do so much else – but women are probably better off 
with a state system of support that doesn’t rely on men 
75  Id. at 183-186. While child support enforcement probably does curb population growth somewhat, this is 
a controversial goal particularly for the United States.  
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relationship with the other parent.  This first wrong depends on Altman’s premise that 
children experience a parent’s failure to pay child support as a sign that the parent does 
not love the child.  Payment of child support prevents the child from feeling abandoned.  
The second wrong relies on the evidence that children do better in two parent 
households.76  If one fails the child by forcing it to grapple with the competing loyalties 
of a separated family, one must pay for that harm.   
 
Altman’s tort theory is provocative and may well justify the current legal models for 
child support in cases of divorce77 but it is not a model that explains biological 
parenthood liability at all.  Indeed, it is a model deeply evocative of the marital regime 
we are supposedly leaving behind.  Among other things it would seem to place the child 
support duty on a husband who was not biologically related to a child of the marriage 
before it placed liability on the biological father. This may well be an appropriate result,78 
but is hardly one that suggests that biological truth should trump marital presumption.   
Altman’s theory also provides weak support for the realistically atypical but theoretically 
prototypical “one-night stand”  father.79 If it is no longer appropriate to punish the adults 
who engage in casual sex because casual sex is not itself immoral, it is hard to see why 
we should operate from a baseline which assumes that two people who sleep together 
have a moral obligation to commit to an on-going family relationship.   More important, 
Altman’s theory of harm simply does not work if the child’s psychological needs for love 
and stability are met by someone other than biological parents.80     Thus, though he 
explains why the break-up of a traditional family should engender child support liability 
in the adults who split up, he does not explain a biologically-based child support system.  
 
 *  *  *  * 
 
The strength of the norm for biological parenthood thus must be found in places other 
than, or at least in addition to, history, nature and morality.  Biological parents may be the 
adults most likely to take care of children, but that does not prove that we have always 
                                                 
76  See CARBONE,  supra note 1 at  11-119.  
77  Most of these marginal expenditure models determine liability based the amount the obligor would pay 
“if he were sharing a home with the child and the other parent,” , AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES 
OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, § 3.03(2)(c) (2002)  (hereinafter, PRINCIPLES) 
78  See Nygard v. Nygard, 401 NW2d 323, 327 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (holding man who married pregnant 
woman knowing that he was not the biological father and promised to raise the child as his own is 
responsible for child support); Clevenger v. Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (Cal. Ct. App 1961) (same);  
Peitros v. Peitros, 638 A2d 545, 548 (RI 1994) (“voluntary and continuous course of conduct as the child’s 
only father” and the fact that the mother’s  choice not to terminate the pregnancy qwas “a direct result of 
[man’s] assurances that he would assume parental role” made non-biologically related man responsible for 
child support); Monmouth County Div. of Soc. Serv. V. R.K., 757 A.2d 319 (NJ Super Ct. Ch. Div 2000) 
(man never married mothers but acted as a father and therefore estopped from denying paternity).  
79   Most unwed fathers have relationships of significant duration with the mother.  See Katharine K. Baker, 
Bargaining or Biology, 14 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL. 1, 35-36  (2004)  (2/3 of paternity suites involve men 
who were present at the birth of the child; 80% of unwed fathers support the mother during pregnancy; 
approximately 85% of unmarried fathers who are involved with a teenage mother continue the relationship 
for over 2 years after the child’s birth).   
80 Perhaps he believes that children’s psychological needs have biological roots and cannot be met by non-
biological parents, but he neither makes nor substantiates this claim.  For related claims, see infra text 
accompanying notes 138-142.  
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required them to, that they have a biological interest in doing so, or that they are morally 
compelled to do so.  Biological parents do help create a child’s dependency, but so do 
other people and so do the social norms into which the child is born.  The next section 
takes a closer look at why certain interest groups might have a particular interest in 
maintaining the norm of biological parenthood.    
 
II.  Who Benefits from Bionormativity 
 
A.  State’s Interest 
 
The history discussed in Part I suggests one obvious state interest in a bionormative 
system, money.  A bionormative system helps identify two private sources of financial 
support for each child.  The more children are provided for by private parties, the less the 
state needs to provide for them. Because a bionormative system appears to make 
parenthood a pre or extra legal fact, the state is also able to avoid, for the most part, 
qualitative assessments of parenting.  Biology determines who parents are, the state does 
not. In addition, a bionormative system reifies the binariness of parenthood.  There are 
two and only two biological parents of a child.  A discussion of how the state benefits 
from all of these attributes of bionormativity follows.  
 
The British Poor Laws in the 16th century and the United States Federal Child Support 
Act in the 20th century were both motivated by a desire to recoup state funds paid to poor 
children.  Not all countries are as motivated to pass the cost of children on to private 
parties,81 but many clearly are.  The United States, with its steadfast resistance to greater 
state support of children,82  leads the industrialized world in its resistance to public 
support of children.83  This resistance to supporting children reflects basic principles of 
classical liberalism, which views the state’s role as limited to protecting people’s 
negative rights84 and depends on a clear divide between the public (where all individuals 
are seen as equal rights-bearing citizens) and the private (where inequalities may exist but 
needs of dependents are met altruistically, without state interference).85  For a variety of 
reasons, the United States’ allegiance to the norms of classical liberalism appear stronger 
                                                 
81   As indicated, France has always had a much more limited paternity enforcement. See supra text 
accompanying notes 31-32.  Today, in Europe, virtually all states assume substantial  responsibility for 
ensuring that children’s basic needs are met.  See infra  166-171.  
82 The drafters of the recent American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution wrote 
“What distinguishes the United States from other wealthy western countries is its disinclination to act as a 
primary guarantor of children’s economic adequacy.”  See  PRINCIPLES, supra note 77 at  §3.04 cmt. g at 
429. 
83 Ironically, by maintaining a stricter allegiance to bionormativity, that is, by giving biological parents both 
more responsibility and more rights, the United States may actually stifle the extent to which biological 
parenthood is established.  See W. Craig Williams, The Paradox of Paternity Establishment: As Rights Go 
up, Rates Go Down, 8 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 261 (1997) (arguing that by giving fathers more rights 
and responsibility, the United States may actually decrease the willingness of biological mothers to name 
fathers or fathers to come forward)   
84  See C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM 263-267 (1962).  
85 See generally, O’CONNOR ET AL., supra note 13 at 45-46. 
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than many of its peer countries.86  A state that sees itself as responsible for supporting 
children needs not only figure out what children need, it needs to articulate why children 
are entitled and where the entitlement should come from.  A minimalist state can avoid 
establishing the apparatus necessary to answer these questions by passing the obligation 
for children onto private actors.   
 
One of the ways the United States passes that obligation onto private actors is in our child 
support doctrine.   Any child not residing with an adult who is legally responsible for 
providing for that child is entitled to child support payments from the non-resident parent.  
The state determines this obligation, but what the child is entitled to is a function of what 
her parents earn, not a function of what the child needs.   Child support doctrine 
purposively ignores the question of how much it costs to raise a child.87   Defenders of 
this methodology contend that inquiries about what children need lead to “answers that 
focus on some minimum level of subsistence.”88  Focusing on what children need thus 
might disadvantage children of wealthier parents who, arguably, should receive more 
than just what they need.  So, in the name of making sure wealthy children get their share 
(or perhaps in the name of ensuring that wealthy men pay their share), we conceptualize a 
child’s entitlement as having little to do with the child and everything to do with the 
parents.89  This leads to a nation in which 13.5 million children live below the poverty 
level and 29.2 million live in households that cannot meet their children’s basic needs.90  
This childhood poverty is not perceived to be the responsibility of the state precisely 
because children are the responsibility of their biological parents.91  
   
Another way in which the state passes the child support obligation onto private actors is, 
in some instances, to ignore biological parenthood.  Although these cases seem at first to 
reject bionormativity, in some respects, they affirm it.  A survey of cases in which non-
biologically related men were found responsible for child support suggests that paternity 
doctrine can be as much about biparenting as it is about biology.92  When confronted with 
an extant parenting relationship that is not rooted in biology, courts often refuse to make 
                                                 
86  O’CONNOR ET AL., supra note 13 at 55-56.  This stronger allegiance to classical liberalism may be the 
result of the historical moment when the United States broke from Britain (a moment at which notions of 
classical liberalism were at their zenith) and/or the absence of an historically strong central church or state 
presence in the United States.  
87 See generally, Ira Ellman, Fudging Failure: The Economic Analysis Used to Construct Child Support 
Guidelines, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 167.   
88  THOMAS J. ESPENSHADE, INVESTING IN CHILDREN: NEW ESTIMATES OF PARENTAL EXPENDITURES 1-2 
(Rub. Inst. 1984).  
89 This schema for determining child support further undermines the theory that biological parents are 
responsible for child support because they caused the child and his or her dependency.   Tort law makes 
one responsible for the extent to which one caused injury to  (or dependency of)  another, but a tortfeasor 
takes the plaintiff as he finds her and is only required to pay for any additional hardship he has caused.  The 
millionaire tortfeasor and the pauper tortfeasor owe the same amount of money if they caused the same 
kind of injury.   The same is not true of the millionaire and pauper parent.  (I am grateful to Susan Appleton 
for pointing out this analogy.)   
90 National Center for Children in Poverty, Basic Facts About Low-Income Children: Birth to Age 18, 
http://www.nccp.org/public_06.html. 
91  For further discussion on why welfare provisions like Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) do not 
adequately supplement parental income, see infra  text accompanying ntoes 161-162..   
92 Baker, supra note 79 at 16. 
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biology primary.  The marital presumption is the most famous example of this, but even 
as its importance ebbs, courts find other ways of ignoring biology if biological 
parenthood runs the risk of leaving the child without adequate resources. Sometimes a 
non-biological father is held responsible simply because the biological father cannot be 
found. 93  In other cases, a biological father may be available but the non-biological father 
was there first or is better able to provide, so the court refuses to order biological tests. 94     
Other times courts favor finality (of a prior paternity order) over biological evidence.95  
As long as the child is being supported by two parents, the law often blinks the biology 
question.   
 
Obviously, at some level, these cases suggest weak state support for bionormativity – 
after all, these cases vest parental responsibility in someone other than a biological parent 
- but these cases also show a very strong allegiance to binary parenthood.    These courts 
do not contemplate the idea of tripartite parenthood (even though there are often 3 
obvious candidates for parental status), and they are very resistant to leaving a child with 
just one parent (even if there often only one person who is biologically related.)  The 
arbitrariness of this system, in which whether a biological father is roped into or free to 
establish his fatherhood depends on a set of situations he may have nothing to do with, 
and whether the non-biological father remains a father can depend on the fortuity of 
being able to locate the biological father, might strike us as quite odd, were it not for the 
undeniable binariness of biological parenthood.    Biologically there are always two and 
only two parents.  The law adheres to biology’s binary commandment even as it ignores 
biology itself.  If biological parenthood weren’t the norm, this allegiance to two would be 
much harder to justify.   
 
The allegiance to two – particularly a heterosexual two - is very important to a liberal 
state though. The state wants two parents because if there is only one, that one is likely to 
be a woman and women often do not have enough resources to raise a child.96 Enforcing 
a minimum of two makes it much more likely that men’s resources will get to children.   
But more than two gets tricky.  The more people with claims to a child, the more courts 
have to make decisions with regard to what is in a child’s best interest because the more 
likely it is that one of the parents will be challenging the parenting work of others.   
Whenever legal parents are separated, the court is responsible for resolving child-rearing 
disputes between them.97 Given the number of children of divorced or never married 
parents today, courts already do a great deal of this work, but no one thinks courts are 
                                                 
93 See Monmouth City Div of Soc Servs. v. R.K, 757 A.2d 319, 327 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div 2000) (citing 
Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351 (N.J. 1984).  
94 See In re Kiana A. v. Mario A., 93 Cal. App. 4th 1109 (2001).  
95 In re Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488, 496 (Mass. 2001) (refusal to order blood test appropriate in 
light of “the weight of authority enforcing the finality of paternity judgments”). 
96 Evolutionary biology can explain both why women are more likely to be the one parent (if there is only 
one), see supra text accompanying notes 44-48, and why men are likely to have more resources (they can 
spend their time gathering resources because they have to invest less in each child). Even if one rejects any 
and all theory stemming from evolutionary biology, history clearly shows that women are much more 
likely to be single parents than are men and men have more resources than women.  
97 Importantly, when parents are not separated, they are afforded great latitude to parent as they wish. See 
infra text accompanying notes 109-114   .  
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particularly good at it, and courts resist it.98  The more parents with competing claims to a 
child, the higher the likelihood that the state becomes involved in the day-to-day business 
of parenting.     A liberal state does not covet this role and may not be well served by it.99   
“[A]ffirmative sponsorship of ethical, religious or political beliefs [that is, much of what 
constitutes parenting] is something we expect the state not to attempt in a society 
constitutionally committed to the ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice.” 100  
Thus, a liberal state prefers a parental norm that keeps parental legal disputes to a 
minimum, while ensuring access to enough resources for the child.  By minimizing the 
number of people who can claim parental rights, while ensuring that there are at least two 
potential sources of support for a child, bionormativity serves the state’s interest.   
 
Finally, and related, the state is attracted to a bionormative system because just as it 
allows the state to avoid day-to-day parenting decisions, it allows the state to avoid most 
initial parentage determinations.  Most biological parents do want to take on the 
emotional and financial burdens of parenthood. Because they do, the state does not have 
to expend resources establishing parental status. By rooting parenthood in biological fact 
rather than, for instance, intent to parent or ability to parent, a bionormative system 
requires no ex ante evaluation of parents.  Adoption, which usually involves a state-
required examination of the potential adoptive parents is the one traditional exception.101  
For all other parents, the state appears to leave the parentage decision to nature.102   
 
The state thus benefits from the privacy of bionormativity because the state does not have 
to pay for children. It benefits from the exclusivity of bionormativity because the state 
does not have to entertain competing claims to parenthood.  It benefits from the 
binariness of bionormativity simply because the number two appears to appropriately 
balance the first two state priorities, relying on private funding and limiting the class of 
parents.  Finally, the state benefits, indirectly, from the biology of  bionormativity 
because it  appears to make parenthood a function of a question that the state has no 
expertise to answer.  This interest is not in biology, per se, but just in the fact that biology 
usually provides a parentage answer so that the state does not have to. 
 
B.  Parents’ Interest in Bionormativity.  
                                                 
98 For a summary of some of the criticisms of courts applying the best interest of the child standard, see 
Katharine K. Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs:  Respecting Autonomy by Valuing Connection, 
59 OHIO ST. L. J. 1523, 1559-60 (1998). 
99  Various scholars, of different political stripes, have argued that the government benefits when parents 
are free to inculcate their own children with their own values.  This kind of value-laden education helps 
nurture autonomous adults who can function well in a pluralistic society. See Katharine Bartlett, Rethinking 
Parenthood as an Exclusive Stats: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear 
Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 890-93 (1984); Bruce C. Hefen, The Constitutional Status of 
Marriage, Kinship and Sexual Privacy – Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 
463, 480-82 (1983); Stephen Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
937, 960 (1996).  
100 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1979). 
101 For more on how a bionormative system incorporates (with some difficulty) the idea of adoption see 
infra  text accompanying notes  193-196.  
102 Though, the need for paternity establishment as a legal matter and the need for the marital presumption 
show that the state has always been aware that nature does not always provide two parents.  
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The idea that biological parents might have an interest in bionormativity seems at once 
ridiculously obvious and curiously difficult.  It seems obvious because of course 
biological parents want to parent their own biological children and not someone else’s.  
Instinct, evolutionary biology and the rapidly growing reproductive technology business 
all suggest that if possible, people would rather parent children who share their genetic 
material.103   The fact that most people who want to parent would prefer a genetic link 
does not mean that all people who have a genetic link want to parent, however.  What 
interest do biological parents have in a system that confers parental status on those who 
do not want it?  Phrased this way the question seems much harder.  The argument that 
follows suggests that biological parents, like the state, are attracted to the private and 
exclusive nature of bionormativity.    
 
Most people probably decide to parent because they believe that the emotional and 
financial costs of having children are worth the benefits that one receives.104 Indeed, 
scholars argue that the child support obligation might be justified as the legitimate price 
to be paid for the benefits that parents receive from parenting. 105   Support for this 
supposition comes with the data showing that the vast majority of child support that gets 
paid gets paid without any state enforcement effort.106 That is, most parents willingly 
embrace their responsibility to support their children.  These parents also might embrace  
financial aid from the state to help ease the financial burden of parenting, though.  Why 
turn down money?  The answer to that turns on how an acceptance of government aid 
could undermine the private nature of parenting.  
   
It is interesting to note that in this country, unlike peer countries,  when the government 
does provide aid to any parents other than the very poor, it does so in the form of a tax 
cut or tax exemption, not a universal child allowance.107   Aid is thus packaged as money 
being returned, not as active state participation in parenting.  This conceptualization 
conforms to notions of a minimalist liberal state, a state that plays no role in the support 
of children.  In doing so, this conceptualization also protects what has emerged in this 
country as a fairly solid understanding of parental autonomy.   Along with the 
responsibility to raise children on their own, comes the right to raise children without 
state interference, a right protected because it is part of the “private realm of family life 
which the state cannot enter.”108   
 
                                                 
103   Of course, some people who can have their own genetic issue also choose to adopt.   
104  Some people may have children only because they feel pressured to do so and it is extraordinarily hard 
to assess either the costs or the benefits of having children, so it is difficult to say whether the benefits of 
children do exceed the costs for many people.   
105  See Altman, supra note 71 at 186-87 (considering, though ultimately rejecting this idea because it 
demeans children to think of child support as a “user’s fee.”);  Ann Estin, Love and Obligation: Family 
Law and the Romance of Economics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989 (“acting rationally a couple will choose 
to have children only if they parenthood as more pleasurable than the other pleasures their time and money 
can buy”)  
106 Leslie Joan Harris, Reconsidering the Criteria for Legal Fatherhood, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 461, 476.  
107 Lee Rainwater and Timothy Smeeding, Doing Poorly: The Real income of American children in a 
Comparative Perspectiv, Luxemboug Income Study  8 21 (1995).  
108 Prince v. Mass, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).  
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Although not without controversy,109 the constitutional right to “bring up [a] child in the 
way he should go”110 is safely vested in parents.111  “The “primary role of the parents in 
the upbringing of their children is . . . established beyond debate as an enduring American 
tradition.”112  A child must not be viewed as “the mere creature of the state.”113 Vesting 
the right to raise and socialize children in parents is thought critical to ensuring a 
pluralistic citizenry, one that has proper respect for the concept of individual liberty and 
individual rights.114  
 
Vesting parents with the “right, coupled with the high duty”115 to socialize children 
clearly  serves parents’ interests.   Human rights charters, constitutions and popular 
sentiment often consider parenthood central to human flourishing.116    It is thought 
central to people’s lives because children provide unique bonds of love that give meaning 
and depth to our lives.117   Rearing children is often also a deeply expressive activity.  
“Child-rearing is one of the ways in which people fulfill and express their deepest values 
about how life is to be lived.”118  The degree of sacrifice and the relentless need to step 
outside of one’s own self-interest allow parents to achieve a transcendent form of 
selflessness that is very difficult to replicate in any other context.119    
 
                                                 
109 See Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child, Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 995 (1992) 
110  Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944).  (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and 
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for 
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.” Id. at 166)  
111  Sixty years of Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters were decided, Justice Brennan 
commented “I think I am safe in saying that no one doubt the wisdom or validity of those decisions.”  
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 143 (1989) (Brennan, J. dissenting).  
112 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).  
113 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).  
114  See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923).  The court contrasted the state run socialization 
practices envisioned by people like Plato with the American tradition and suggested that the Greek tradition 
was one “wholly different from the ones upon which our institutions rest. . . . ”  
115  Pierce, supra note 113 at 535. 
116 “The project of parenting – having, nurturing and educating one’s children – is central to our conception 
of human flourishing.”  Gilles, supra note 99 at  962 (1996).   See the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 1966, Article 21 § 2 (“The right of men and women . . . to found a family shall be 
recognized.”) http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm;  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, Chaper II, Article 9 (“the right to . . . found a family shall be guaranteed . . . “) http:www.eruoparl. 
uropa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf ;  
117   See Bluestein, supra note 61 at 118 (Adults parent “not because . . . [children] will continue the family, 
or are potential sources of relief and aid, but because they are new bonds of love.”);  Kenneth Karst, The 
Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 632 (1980) (“to be human is to need to love and be 
loved.”)  
118   David A.J. Richards, The Individual, The Family, and The Constitution:  A Jurisprudential 
Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 28 (1980).   
119   See Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 301 (1988) (parenthood 
allows parents to realize their “ennobled selves”; Bruce Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family 
Law: The Waning of Belonging, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 40 (parents can be amazed at the level of patience, 
perseverance that they can muster in pursuit of helping their children achieve their goals);  JANE SWIGART, 
THE MYTH OF THE BAD MOTHER 188-199, quoting an anonymous father  (“You can’t love children in the 
abstract, not if you take care of them every day . . . You have to get into self-sacrifice . . . But it’s been the 
best thing that’s ever happened to me.” ) . 
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To a certain extent, these expressive and constitutive aspects of parenting require privacy.  
In order to rear children in a manner that expresses “our deepest values about how life is 
to be lived,” we must have freedom from too much state intervention in the process.120  In 
order to feel genuine love, one must generate the sentiment from within, not have it 
imposed from outside. Comparably, in order to achieve the kind of ennoblement that 
parenthood can provide, one must find that selflessness inside oneself.   The ability to 
realize a rich and ennobling life as a parent thus may depend in part on a 
conceptualization of parenting as a private enterprise.    
 
Government support of children jeopardizes that parental privacy. Once the government 
starts financing activities that have been protected as private, the protection usually falls 
away.121  Parents’ right to be free from a meddlesome government dictating how their 
children are to be reared, educated, and loved depends on the government delegating (or, 
perhaps, never entertaining the idea of accepting) the rights and responsibilities of 
parenthood.122 
 
Biological parents also clearly have an interest in the exclusive nature of biological 
parenthood.  In a system in which the status of parent is a direct function of  genetic 
connection and only genetic connection, biological parents simply do not have to worry 
about that status being taken away.   As a matter of biology, one is or is not a parent. The 
only qualifying characteristic biology demands is genetic connection and nothing in 
nature can sever that genetic connection.  The exclusivity of biology delegitimizes 
attempts by others or by a not-so-liberal state to dictate the terms pursuant to which one is 
allowed to become a parent or stay a parent.   
 
A parental regime that was based on something like parental effort, or intent, or assumed 
responsibility, would require much more state interference.  Depending on the situation in 
which the child was born and raised, there could be many people claiming parental rights.  
The state would have to determine parental status based on nuanced and difficult-to-
document evidence of love and investment, not on clear objective evidence of genetic 
connection.  Thus, willing biological parents who would parent and support their children 
                                                 
120 Emily Buss analogizes the parental right at issue to other fundamental rights, like speech or religion, and 
notes that the court usually protects the ability to make bad or dangerous decisions with regard to speech or 
religion precisely because it is the decision-making process itself, not just the result of that decision 
enhances autonomy and human flourishing.  Emily Buss, Parental Rights After Troxel v. Granville, 2000 
SUP. CT. REV. 279, 291.  
121 Doe v. Bolton , 432 US 464 (1977)  (right to abortion, grounded in privacy, does not include right to 
government financing even if government funds other health services);  Wyman v. James, 400 US 309 
(1971)  (fourth amendment right to protection from unreasonable searches and seizure does not require 
social services workers to obtain a warrant before the investigate the home of a parent receiving state 
support  payments).   
122 We do have an extensive public education system that tries to do much of the rearing and educating that 
was traditionally left to parents. Parents who send their children to public school may relinquish a good 
deal of their parental authority.  As in many other aspects of parenting, though, the extent to which one 
must relinquish control in the education setting is largely dependent on class.  Not only can more wealthy 
parents home school their children or send their children to parochial or other private schools, wealthy 
parents can choose to live in politically and culturally homogeneous communities in which their children 
will likely only be exposed to ideas that conform to the parents’ value systems.   
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anyway benefit from a regime that imposes parental status on unwilling biological 
parents because such a regime, for the most part, keeps the state out of the parenting 
process.  Bionormativity reifies the notion that children are a private good, not public 
responsibility and it thereby reinforces willing parents’ claims to freedom from too much 
state intervention.  
 
Parents’ attraction to binary parenting is a little more nuanced. As individuals, parents 
might prefer a regime that vested exclusive parental rights in one, not two parents.  
Divorcing parents fighting over custody almost certainly feel this way, as do many never-
married mothers.123  Thus, parents’ attraction to binary parenthood probably depends on 
the existence of state support.  If a parent could assume state support, that parent would 
probably have little interest in a binary norm.  If that parent wanted to share the parenting 
process, he or she could, but the choice would up to the parent, not the state.  Parental 
rights could be exclusively granted to one.124   If one cannot assume state support, 
though, binary parenthood allows adults to share the duties of providing and caring.  
Supporting a child, while simultaneously caring for that child, is often simply  too 
onerous for a single parent.  Binary parenting allows the burdens to be shared without 
allowing the benefits to become too diffuse. A strong allegiance to two helps keep third 
parties at bay.  In other words, a strong allegiance to binary parenthood is a strong 
allegiance to exclusive parenthood and serves parents’ interests in freedom from too 
much intrusion from others.   On balance, then, given uncertainty as to state support, 
traditional parents probably favor a binary regime.  
 
Finally, parents have some interest in a biological norm simply because most people 
parenting are parenting their own genetic issue.  These parents need not go through a 
qualification process before they are considered parents (though if their parenthood is 
challenged, they might have to submit to testing).   Such a qualification system might be 
onerous (a judicial determination of intent or ability to parent, for instance) or incredibly 
easy (conclusive parenthood vested in whosever name was on a birth certificate), but, at 
the moment, most parents are able to assume parental status without having to go through 
any registration system at all. 125 
 
C.  Children’s Interest 
 
Any discussion of children’s interests should probably start with the premise that it is 
incredibly difficult to ascertain children’s interests in the abstract.  With the exception of 
some unassailable truths about children needing love, support, and attention, little can be 
                                                 
123 Almost half (43%) of never-married mothers who do not receive child support from the child’s father 
say that they do not want receive support from the father.  ANDREW BELLER & JOHN GRAHAM, SMALL 
CHANGE: THE ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT 21 (1993).  
124 See MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER 20TH CENTURY 
TRAGEDIES (1995).  (advocating a regime in which the family was defined by a caretaker-child dyad, not 
marriage or genetic parenthood).   
125  In most states today, a name on a birth certificate or a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity sets up a  
presumption of parenthood, but one that can be easily rebutted later.  See e.g., Uniform Parentage Act § 
4(5) (1973).  Failure to list a name on a birth certificate in no way precludes one from trying to assert 
parenthood later, but, in an alternative regime, it could.   
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proved about what is best for children because multiple causation problems make reliable 
empirical studies of family life almost impossible to design.126  Nonetheless, most people 
agree that we must consider children’s interests in any question about parenthood and 
many people probably think that children’s interests should be primary.  As this section 
will show, children’s interests in bionormativity are not the same as the state’s or 
parents’.  While most children share an interest in the private aspects of bionormativity, 
their interest in exclusive parenthood is more muted and their interest in binary 
parenthood is more muted still.  Moreover, children seem to have what is potentially the 
strongest interest in the biology of biological parenthood.  There is evidence that children 
may be best served if raised by their biological parents, though the evidence is far from 
definitive.   
 
To the extent that norms a bionormative regime usually provides children with homes in 
which they are loved and reared without meddling from the state or other third parties, 
children benefit.  Children need to feel like they belong somewhere.127  The less a child 
belongs to any one parent, or set of parents,  the less that child may feel like he belongs to 
someone or something.   Children also need to know and be taught not only specific 
values, but a belief system from which they can evaluate the world around them.128   
Children need to know “what it is to have a coherent way of life . . . [in which they 
experience] caring, long-term relationships with others.”129   As Emily Buss writes, 
“[p]arents’ strong emotional attachment to their children and considerable knowledge of 
their particular needs make parents the child-specific experts most qualified to assess and 
pursue their children’s best interests in most circumstances.”130  If children’s dependency 
and child-rearing needs are seen primarily as public obligations, not private 
responsibilities, children may be deprived of the intense, value-laden socialization 
processes that private homes can provide.   
 
Children’s interest in the exclusive nature of bionormative parenting is somewhat more 
complicated.  To the extent that children benefit from stable, non-acrimonious home 
environments, they benefit from a regime in which parents and potential parents are not 
fighting with each other over parental rights.  The more adults debate and clash over how 
to raise a child the less coherent the child’s way of life. The fewer adults with potential 
relationship rights to a child, the less likely that there will be a fight.  But to the extent 
that children develop important emotional relationships with adults other than their legal 
parents, they may also have an interest in multiple parenthood.  Exclusive parenthood 
often deprives children of some of the most meaningful relationships in their lives.131  
                                                 
126See Lee Teitelbaum, Moral Discourse and Family Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 430, 437 (1985). 
127  Many scholars argue that one needs a sense of belonging before one can grow into a sense of autonomy. 
See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, RECONCEIVING AUTONOMY: SOURCES, THOUGHTS AND POSSIBILITIES 1, 24 
(1989) (a precondition for feeling autonomous if feeling connected); Martha Minnow, Forming Underneath 
Everything that Grows: Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 819, 894 (“belonging is 
essential to becoming”) 
128 Baker, Property Rules, supra note 97 at 1543-44. 
129 Gilles, supra note 98 at 941.  
130  Emily Buss, Parental Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 647 (2002). 
131 See infra note 184-190.  
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The more likely it is that those meaningful relationships will develop with non-traditional 
parents, the less interest children have in exclusive parenthood.   
 
As far as children’s interest in binary parenting is concerned, much has  been written 
about how much children benefit from the presence of two parents. Sara McLanahan, 
probably the leading researcher on the subject of children in single parent families 
concludes “ children who grow up apart from one of their parents are disadvantaged 
across a broad array of outcomes. In fact, in almost any measure child well-being that 
you look at, these children are disadvantaged.”132  McLanahan concludes that half of the 
disadvantage that children of single parents experience is due to economic factors: single 
parent homes have less money than two parent homes. But, there is still a significant 
amount of hardship that children of single parents endure for reasons that have nothing to 
do with economic resources.   Much of it probably comes from the fact that parenting 
involves emotional and physical investment, not just financial investment.  One person 
simply cannot provide as much emotional and physical support as can two.  Numerous 
scholars cite this as proof that children benefit from having two parents for reasons that 
have nothing to do with economics.133    
 
It is important to underscore what McLanahan’s research does not say though.  Most 
important, it says very little about the advantages of having two separated parents. All of 
McLanahan’s work focuses on the effects of having (or not having) two parents in the 
household, not two parents in existence.  In other words, McLanahan has something to 
say about how divorce and failure to marry affects children, but little to say about how 
binary parenthood affects children.   
 
Children with more than one parent have more potential resources available to them. 
Thus, children may be attracted to binary parenthood for the same reason that the state is,  
but McLahahan herself has suggested that the harms from the conflict associated with 
collecting support from never-married fathers outweighs the benefits of the extra 
money.134  If this is right, forcing parenthood on unwilling parents is not in children’s 
interest. Moreover, children of high-conflict marriage suffer real harm as a result of that 
conflict and children of divorce are often hurt bteh conflict and tension that divorce 
breeds.135      The custodial parent’s anxiety level is the most important factor in 
predicting child well-being after divorce.136   Thus, though on the surface it might seem 
                                                 
132 Carbone, supra note 1 at 112, quoting McLanahan interview on Frontline (Public Broadcasting System):  
The Vanishing Father (1995; documentary)   
133 Marsha Garrison, Law-Making for Baby-making:  An Interpretive Approach to the Determiantion of 
Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV 835, 887 (2000)(citing McLanahan and Sandefeur and claiming that 
children therefore need two parents);  DAVID POPENOE, LIFE WITHOUT FATHER (1996) (arguing that 
children psychological health depends on having a male and female parent); DAVID BLANKENHORN, 
FATHERLESS AMERICA (1995) (same).  
134 SARA MCLANAHAN, Child Support Enforcement and Child Well-Being: Greater Security or Greater 
Conflict?, in CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL-BEING 239, 254 (Irwin Garfinkel et al. eds., 1994).  
135 See  F. FURSTENBERG AND A. CHERLIN, THE FAMILY AND PUBLIC POLICY: WHAT HAPPENS TO CHILDREN 
WHEN PARENTS PART 64  (1991) (children hurt by high conflict regardless of whether parents divorce);  P. 
AMATO AND A. BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK 204 (1997) (children “residing with parents in poor-quality 
marriages, divorce does not appear to have negative long-term consequences.”) 
136 See FURSTENBERG AND CHERLIN, DIVIDED FAMILIES 75 (1991) .  
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like children were attracted to binary parenting for the same financial reasons the state is, 
children’s interest is more conditional.   Children appear to have an interest in two 
sources of support only if the process of getting that second source of support is not too 
conflict-ridden.  While the number two seems to make sense for both the state and 
parents, because of the way in which it balances the need for resources with the desire for 
limited access, children may not benefit from two.  Even though two ensures mores 
resources, children may be better off without those resources if there is too much conflict 
associated with securing them. At the same time, if there are serious claims for parental 
rights based on a real established relationship with a third adult, children may be better 
off if those rights are respected.  Binariness for binariness’ sake does not appear to meet 
many children’s interests.   
 
What really marks the difference in children’s interest in bionormativity though is 
children’s interest in the biology of biological parenthood.  Children may benefit from the 
state imposing parental status on unwilling adults precisely because those unwilling 
adults contributed genetic material to a child.  There are, currently, medical benefits 
associated with knowing the health histories of one’s genetic relatives.   Being raised by 
one’s biological parents helps ensure access to genetic information that can play an 
important role in medical treatment.  The rapid advances in genetic science have 
increased the utility of this information, though advances will also, most predict, make 
genetic history irrelevant.  As we come to know more about the human genome and are 
able to predict and treat based on an individual’s presenting DNA, family history, which 
at best suggests likelihood of traits, will become much less important.137 
 
There may also be psychological benefits associated with being raised by one’s biological 
parents though.  Some people argue that in order to have a healthy understanding of 
oneself, one needs to know the source of one’s genetic material.  Proponents of this 
theory usually cite Erik Erikson for the idea that a healthy sense of identity requires 
integrating one’s past into one’s present and one’s vision of the future.138   Living and 
being cared for by one’s biological parents is arguably the best way to achieve that 
healthy identity.   
 
Identity theory owes its current legal prominence to the open adoption movement which, 
in the 1960s, began to question whether the secrecy that had been employed to protect 
both birth mother and adoptee actually hurt both birth mother and adoptee.  Psychologists 
                                                 
137 See Robert F. Service, The Race for the $1000 Genome, 17 SCIENCE 1544-46 (2006) (describing rapid 
advances in genome sequencing and suggesting that inexpensive genome treating will be available soon.)  
138   See e.g., Sullivan and Lathrop, Openness in Adoption:  Retrospective Lessons and Prospective 
Choices, 26 CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES REVIEW 393-411 (2004) (discussing Erikson’s claim that 
identity involves a subjective sense of sameness and continuity);  Harold D. Grotevant, Coming to Terms 
with Adoption:  The Construction  of Identity from Adolescence into Adulthood, 1 ADOPTION Q. 1, 10 
(referring to Erikson’s work discussing an aspect of identity as “continuity across past, present and 
future.”);  See also BARBARA WOODHOUSE, ARE YOU MY MOTHER? (discussing others’ work on identity) 
and June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood:  Uncertainty at the Core of Family Identity, 65 LA. 
L. REV. 1295, 1315 (2005)   (incorporating Woodhouse’s work). 
   Interestingly, Erikson, who was raised by his biological mother and an adoptive father, chose not 
to find his biological father when presented with the opportunity to do so.  BETTY JEAN LIFTON,  JOURNEY 
OF THE ADOPTED SELF 206 (1994). 
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suggested that keeping biological origins secret led to a sense of “genealogical 
bewilderment”139 in adoptees.   They noted that many adoptees experienced a sense of 
loss that was thought “more pervasive, less socially recognized and more profound” than 
the kinds of parental losses other children might endure.140  As one psychologist put it, 
“the desire to know one’s biological origins and parentage results from a deeply felt 
psychological and emotional need, a need for roots, for existential continuity and for a 
sense of completeness.”141   The psychologists argued that an adoptee “los[es] his place 
on the intergenerational chain of being.”142   
  
In a concerted effort to address these harms, adoption professionals began discouraging 
sealed records and encouraging what has become known as open adoption.  Now it is the 
rule, rather than the exception, for a birth mother to know the family into which her 
biological children will go. Adopted children and their families know and often keep in 
contact with their biological mothers.143  For most adoptees today the black biological 
box, that had been the hallmark of adoption, has been opened.  Preliminary evidence 
suggests that, while not perfect, open adoption systems work well.144   
  
There is also another small, but growing, class of children searching for their biological 
origins.  Children born by virtue of artificial insemination, either into a married couple, 
into a gay couple or to a single parent have begun to search for information about the 
person who donated the gamete(s) with which they were conceived.145   Worldwide, there 
is a growing trend to help them in their search.  Great Britain recently passed legislation 
ensuring that children born through egg or sperm donation have the ability to trace their 
genetic origins.146  In response to an intense lobbying campaign by some ethicists, 
Canada has enacted a prohibition on compensation for anonymous sperm or egg 
donation.147  Sweden and New Zealand also have known-donor systems.148  In this 
country, children of anonymous sperm donors cannot always find their genetic fathers, 
                                                 
139   H.J. Sants, Genealogical Bewilderment in Children with Substitute Parents, 37 BRIT. J. MED. 
PSYCHOL. 133 (1964) 
140   DAVID M. BRODZINSKY ET AL. BEING ADOPTED 9 (1992)  (comparing the loss of adoption to that of 
others children might experience like divorce or death of a parent).  
141   Fernando Colon, Family Ties and Child Placement, 17 FAM. PROCESS 289, 302. 
142   Grotevant, supra note 138. 
143   The degree of contact with and even knowledge of biological parents is less than one might expect 
given the claims of genealogical bewilderment.  In a study of one New York county, which looked at 
children adopted between 1992-1994, 40% of the adoptees knew the names of the biological mothers, but 
only 17% kept in contact with her.  Only 25% of the adoptees knew the names of their biological fathers 
and only 7% kept in contact with him.  Rosemary Aver, Information Disclosure and Openness in Adoption, 
20 Children and Youth Services Review 51, 69 (1998)..   
144  Adoptive families often report wanting more contact with the birth mother.  
145   The vast majority of these cases involve sperm, not egg donation.  Reproductive specialists have used 
donated eggs for no more than 10 years. Sperm banks have been widely utilized for closer to 70 years.  
146    Are you My Father?  TORONTO STAR, April 16, 2005. 
147   Eggs Shouldn’t Go the Highest Bidder, TORONTO GLOBE AND MAIL, June 4, 2005.  
148  Id.  
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but they have had considerable success using the Internet to find half-siblings.149  Many 
of these children are deeply curious about their genetic origins. 
  
This policy movement in the adoption and technological reproduction areas suggests that 
genetic connection matters to children.  Perhaps that is all we need to conclude that 
therefore children, a particularly vulnerable interest group, have an interest in 
maintaining a biological parental regime.   A closer look at the data may give us pause, 
however, because while the data involving adopted children and children born with 
donated gamete indicates that genetic connection matters, it does not tell us much about 
why it matters.     
 
Consider the sense of loss that has been identified as stemming from not knowing who 
one’s biological parents are.    This loss can easily be conflated with the loss of having 
been relinquished.    If the children born with the help of donated gametes  (“DG 
children”) turn out to experience the same amount of loss and confusion as adoptive 
children, then it will be much easier to identify genetics as the source of the loss, but at 
the moment there is too much static in the data.  To date, DG children tend to express 
their motivations more in terms of curiosity than pain.150   
 
An adoptee is able to understand that she existed as a person, albeit a newborn infant, 
when her biological parents, or at least her biological mother, relinquished parental 
status. The adoptee existed as a baby and her birth mother left.  The same cannot be said 
for the genetic descendent of a sperm or an egg donor, whose genetic parents never know 
her to exist at all and who relinquish parental status only in the remotest sense.  
Moreover, as one adoption researcher put it, “adoption situations are not generally the 
first choice for any member of the triad.”151  Such is not the case for children born to 
single women by choice or into gay couples, whose birth situation often was their 
parents’ first choice.152  
                                                 
149   Hello, I’m Your Sister,  N.Y.TIMES, Nov. 20, 2005,  Web site,  Most US sperm banks still only 
distribute sperm from anonymous donors, but some do have provisions for donors who are willing to be 
contacted at some time in the future.   
150   Although not universally the case, the adoption narratives suggest much more pain and anger than do 
the stories from the DG children.   Compare the interviews from the recent newspaper articles on DG 
children, e.g. Who’s My Daddy?  TORONTO GLOBE AND MAIL, June 18, 2005; Who’s the Daddy?, THE 
GUARDIAN (London) January 3, 2006,  with the stories in LIFTON, supra note 138.    The consistent 
exception to this is the DG children born to heterosexual couples who were not told about the 
circumstances of their birth until they were quite old.  Those children usually feel strong anger at having 
been lied to.  See AJ Turner, A. Coyle, What Does It Mean to be a Donor Offspring, 15 HUM. REPROD. 
2041, 2049 (2000) (“Secrecy in families is damaging.”)   
151  Michael McGinn, Attachment and Separation: Obstacles for Adoptees, J. OF  SOC. DISTRESS AND THE 
HOMELESS 273, 273 (2000).     The triad consists of the biological mother (who often would rather not be 
pregnant or be in a position to keep the child), the adoptive parents (who would rather be having their own 
genetically related child) and the child.   
152   Golombok and MacCallum conclude that the DG children of lesbians and single mothers by choice, 
most of whom are told from the beginning about the circumstances of their birth, are very well-adjusted.  S. 
Golombok & F. MacCallum, Practitioner Review: Outcomes for parents and children following non-
traditional conception, 44 J. of CHILD. PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 303, 311 (2003).  Secrecy is not an option 
for these non-traditional families and their embrace of a non-traditional family structure makes it clear that 
they did not wish for something else.  In contrast , DG children of heterosexual families are often not told 
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Just as important, any discussion of literature on biological connection and adoption cries 
out for a recognition of gender differentiation.   As several commentators have suggested, 
adoptees who struggle with scant information and fantasies about their biological origins 
usually have a picture of their birth as an immaculate conception.153   They are “virtually 
amnesiac” about their birth father.154  Adoptees almost always search for their birth 
mother first and their birth father, if at all, only after they have found their birth 
mother.155   What they yearn for and dream about is a relationship with their birth 
mother.  If identity is about being rooted in one’s genealogical past, why do adoptees 
clearly care more about their mothers?  The disparate treatment of mothers and fathers by 
adoptees suggests either that cultural scripts play a huge role in constructing the 
adoptees’ mental health or that it is something other than genetic material per se that 
adoptees care about.156   
 
It is unlikely that we will get accurate answers as to how much biological connection 
really matters to children before we have to make policy decisions about the importance 
of genetic parenthood in a technologically advanced age.  As mentioned, many countries 
have already enacted legislation making it very difficult to erase the concept of biological 
parenthood. If one is persuaded that the evidence from adoption is applicable and 
                                                                                                                                                 
about the circumstances of their birth because of family embarrassment and stigma associated with not 
being able to reproduce “naturally.”  Id. at 308.  See also, Tuner and Coyle, supra note  at 2049.  
153   LIFTON, supra note 138 at 191;  FREEARK, et al., 75 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 86, 95 (2005) 
154   Freeark, et al., supra note 153.   
155 LIFTON, supra note 138 at 191.  Practical considerations may explain why adoptees search for birth 
mothers so much more frequently.  The mother’s identity is always recorded.  The father’s identity, if 
recorded, is based on the mother’s word and sometimes on her guess.  (All states an adoption to go through 
without the father’s consent if he has abandoned the mother and even when a father gives his consent, there 
is no way of verifying that he is actually the  biological father.)  Searching for one’s biological mother 
instead of one’s biological father may simply be a logical expenditure of resources because one must 
always discount the fact that the man one finds may not be the actual biological father.  Thus, practicality 
may explain why there are more searches for mothers than fathers, but it does not explain why, when 
adoptees are still quite young and well before they start to search, they fantasize about and yearn for a birth 
mother not a birth father. 
156 Either explanation is perfectly plausible.  Culturally, motherhood and fatherhood are lived and perceived 
as very different experiences.  Mothers invest much more time and energy than fathers in parenting their 
children. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER (1999); Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, 
Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 133 (1992) Being a “good mother” as that 
term is culturally understood requires deep emotional investment in one’s children.  Being a good mother is 
also seen as an integral part of being a grown woman.  In contrast, being a “good father” can be limited to 
providing financially.  Adoptees may yearn for their biological mothers because they are told that it is 
mothers that really matter in the parenting enterprise. 
 Biology provides a slightly different reason for why adoptees care more about their mothers:  
mothers had more to do with them being born.   Although not quite immaculate, the biologists’ account of 
human conception involves remarkably little work on the male’s part. See supra text accompanying notes  
47-48.  Intercourse often begins and ends the biological father’s contribution.   If an adoptee feels 
connected to, love for and anger at the people responsible for bringing him into the world and then 
relinquishing him, than the adoptee should feel more of all of that for his mother.  She had much more to do 
with it.  
 Both the cultural and biological explanations of why adopted children search for their mothers not 
their fathers, could also explain why birth mothers are much more likely to search for their biological 
children than are birth fathers.     
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persuasive in the donated gamete context then one should question whether we should 
ever allow intending parents to obtain genetic material from others.  If one is skeptical of 
the adoption data and eager to facilitate more ways for different kinds of parents to 
become parents, then one might be happy to make biological connection irrelevant.   At 
this point, the best one can probably say is that children may have an important interest in 
maintaining a biologically based parental regime.   
 




In sum, while the state, parents and children all have an interest in maintaining a 
bionormative system, what attracts each group to bionormativity differs and the strength 
of that attraction can vary.   The state seems most attracted to the financial ramifications 
of a private regime.  Parents seem most attracted to the parental autonomy associated 
with a private and exclusive regime.  Both the state and parents also benefit from a binary 
principle that balances the need for resources with a preference for exclusivity.  Children, 
on the other hand, though they have some interests in privacy and exclusivity, have  a 
growing interests in non-exclusive parenthood, little interest in a binary principle, but 
perhaps the greatest interest in biology for biology’s sake.  
 
     
III.  The Costs of Bionormativity 
 
 
Despite the numerous advantages of bionormativity suggested above and notwithstanding 
our remarkable modern ability to perfect a biological system, the norm of biological 
parenthood appears to be in a bit of a crisis.  The economic reality, reproductive practices 
and parenting arrangements of a growing number of parents seem to belie 
bionormativity’s universal desirability.  In particular, the qualities of bionormativity that 
make it attractive, it’s private, exclusive, binary  and biological nature, are growing 
increasingly controversial.  This Part explores that controversy. 
 
 A. Funding for Children 
  
The brief history of the paternity suit, explored earlier, suggests that money is one of the 
main reasons the state is attracted to biological parenthood.  The private construction of 
parenthood allows the state to absolve itself of economic responsibility for children.  The 
desire of states to pass off responsibility for children explains why parish courts had such 
an incentive to go after unmarried fathers in medieval England;157 it explains why 
Parliament included paternity provisions in the British Poor Laws;158 and it explains why 
the U.S. Congress mandated that states develop biological paternity rules and strict 
guidelines for child support payment.159   
                                                 
157 See supra  notes 20-22 .  
158 See supra note 24. 
159 See supra note  41.  
 30
 
Child support policy of the last 50 years makes clear, however, that a state eschews 
economic responsibility for children at poor children’s expense. The United States, which 
more than any other industrialized country insists that a bionormative regime can amply 
provide for children, leads the western industrialized world  - by a big margin – in child 
poverty. 160  As indicated, just under 30 million children in this country live without the 
resources necessary to meet their basic needs.161  This poverty is not just a function of 
single mothers or deadbeat dads.  The average unwed father earns just over $16,000 a 
year.162 Just under half of low-income children live with married parents.163  Over half of 
low-income children have at least one parent who works full-time, year-round.164  The 
economies in which many of these parents live simply do not pay enough to support 
children.   
  
The private construction of parenthood does help the children of wealthy parents.  
Children who live in families with incomes in the top 20% of the United States 
distribution have higher standards of living than any other children in the world.165   Of 
the 18 United States peer countries studied by Lee Rainwater and Timothy Smeeding, 
only the wealthy children of Switzerland and Canada had standards of living within 20% 
of the wealthiest U.S. children.166  Middle income children in the United States also do 
well, though not as well comparatively.  Most middle income  children in the 
industrialized world come within 20% of the United States’ standard.167  
 
The reason that the United States defines the extremes of childhood wealth and childhood 
poverty among industrialized nations is that virtually all modern governments  - except 
the U.S. - transfer a significant amount of money from wealthy households to poor 
                                                 
160  See Economic Policy Institute, Economic Snapshots, June 23, 2004, 
http:www.epinet.org/content.cfm.webfeatures_snapshots_06232004  (21.9% of children in the United State 
live below the poverty line. The next highest rate of child poverty is New Zealand’s at 16.3%.  Denmark 
has a child poverty rate of 2.4%. The average child poverty rate for 16 developed countries, excluding the 
U.S., is 10.7%).   
161 National Center for Children in Poverty, Basic Facts About Low-Income Children:  Birth to Age 18 (Jan. 
2006).  
162 Lauren M Rich, Regular and Irregular Earnings of Unwed Fathers:  Implications for Child Support 
Practices? 10 (Bendheim-Thoman Ctr. For Research on Child Wellbeing, Working Paper No. 99-10FF, 
July 1999)  available at http://crcw.princeton.edu/workingpapers/WP99-10-FF-Rich.pdf.  This figure has 
probably gone up some in 8 years and Rich suggests that if one adds in underground employment it goes up 
even more.  But it is highly unlikely that it goes up sufficiently to adequately support a child in another 
household.  
163 National Center for Children in Poverty, http://www.nccp.org/pub_lic06.html, Basic Facts About Low-
Income Children:  Birth to Age 18 (Jan. 2006).  
164 Id.  
165 At least any other children in any other major country.   See Rainwater and Smeeding, supra note 107 at 
8.   
166 Id. 
167 Id. , Figure 2.  Middle income Danish  children actually have the highest standard of living for middle 
income children.  
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ones.168  In doing so, they reject a private construction of parenthood in favor of an ethic 
that makes the well-being of children a collective responsibility.   Rainwater and 
Smeeding found that every one of the countries they studied (except the United States) 
had a form of child or family allowance that went to children regardless of need.169   Most 
of these countries also instituted a minimum guaranteed level of child support to single 
parents in case the noncustodial parent could not or would not pay.170  In some countries 
these guaranteed payments all but eliminated the economic disadvantages that single 
parents faced.  “In Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the UK, poverty rates for single 
parent children are close enough to couples’ rates to not make a great difference in the 
overall poverty rate.”171 
  
All of the United States’ comparison countries have some provision for naming a 
biological father and trying to secure support from him.172  None of these countries reject 
the idea of biological parenthood completely, but neither do they construct 
bionormativity as a private system from which emanates the totality of a child’s 
entitlement.  Nor do they seem to perceive parenthood as essentially binary.  The 
European states’ primary response to poverty is not to extract more or better support from 
biological parents; it is to provide children with more support from the state. Much of this 
support goes to single parents.173  As conservative critics rightly point out, this kind of 
state intervention legitimates single parenthood.174   By doing so, state policy in Europe 
undermines the essential binariness of biological parenthood.175   
  
                                                 
168  Economic Policy Institute, Economic Snapshots, supra note 160  (transfer payments from rich to poor 
are able to reduce child poverty by half in most industrialized countries);  Rainwater and Smeeding, supra 
note 107.   Transfer payments from rich to poor also, of course, decrease the gap between rich and poor.  
169 Rainwater and Smeeding, supra note 107 at  21-22.  
170 Id.   
171 Rainwater and Smeeding, supra note 107 at 13.  
172 See generally Marie-Therese Meulders-Klein, The Status of the Father in European Legislation, 44 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 487, 498-504 (1996) 
173 “The European reaction [to divorce and single parenthood] has been to institute a minimum guaranteed 
level of child support to single mothers.”  Rainwater and Smeeding, supra note 107 at 21.  
174 Patrick Fagan, The Real Root Causes of Violent Crime: The Breakdown of the Marriage, Family and 
Community, The Heritage Foundation, March 17, 1995 (available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Ressearch/Crime/BG1026.cfm (payments to single mothers “discourage the 
formation of intact families.”); Michael Bauman, Dangerous Samaritans, (available at 
http://michaelbauman.comdangeroussamaritans.htm) (“aid to single mothers and their children made low 
income husbands extraneous) Rush Limbaugh, The Ways Things Ought to Be, 19912 “Because it has 
become societally acceptable to have an illegitimate child with the government being substituted as the 
family’s breadwinner in lower and lower-middle classes, the fathers of these children are, in their own 
minds, free to shirk the responsibility and consequences of their actions.”  These criticisms,  
notwithstanding,, it is important to note that the United States, which subsidizes single mothers less than 
European countries do,  still has a higher rate of single parenting.  Rainwater and Smeeding, supra note 107 
at 21.  This suggests that payments to single mothers may not cause single parenthood, though it still can 
work to legitimize it.  
175   In several European countries, unwed biological fathers have very few rights. See Williams, supra note 
84 (suggesting that the Netherlands and Germany assign unwed fathers few rights.); Meulders-Klein, supra 
note 172 (Europe beginning to recognize fathers’ presence more, but has traditionally been much less 
concerned with affording the unwed father any rights.)    
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If the United States were to assume substantially more responsibility for children, 
however, it is likely that notions of parental autonomy would suffer.    Recall that one of 
the reasons that parents were willing to accept the private obligations of a bionormative 
regime was that the right to parental autonomy seemed to follow.  Conceptualizing 
parenthood as a private enterprise, outside of the state’s legitimate sphere of influence or 
duty, helps maintain a strong parental rights ethic.  The state has no business interfering 
in parenting decisions because the state has no business in parenting period.  The more 
the state assumes financial obligations for children, the more precarious a notion of 
parental autonomy may become. The extent to which parental autonomy is not respected 
for poor parents in this country certainly suggests as much.176   
 
For instance, in Wyman v. James, the Supreme Court condoned a social worker’s search 
of a welfare recipient’s home and endorsed the social worker’s intrusive questions about 
parenting simply because the mother was receiving state aid.  The court justified the 
intrusion because it was the child, not the mother, who was the object of the state’s 
concern, and because the state had a “paramount interest and concern in seeing and 
assuring that the intended and proper objects of . . . assistance are the ones who 
benefit.”177  If this reasoning is persuasive, then an expansion of state aid would likely 
eviscerate parental autonomy.   
 
The demise of parental autonomy is not inevitable though. In cases in which the child’s 
family is not receiving public assistance, concern for the child has not, traditionally, 
justified state intrusion.178  The cases from which parental autonomy doctrine emanates 
actually suggest that children benefit from state deference to parents and are hurt by state 
regulation of parents.179   If children benefit from a home environment in which parental 
authority is clear and parents are free to transmit their own values,180 and if children 
benefit from an authoritative structure in which parents, who have unique expertise vis a 
                                                 
176 Annette Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers:  Gender, Rce and Class in the Child 
Protection System, 48 S C L REV 577, 585 (1997) (discussing how the state interferes more with the 
parenting practices of the poor, in part because the poor interface with state agencies more and in part 
because state actors often view poverty itself as deviant and neglectful). .  
177 Wyman v. James 400 US 309, 318-19 (1970).  
178 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923) (state cannot prohibit parents from paying a teacher to teach 
their children German);  Pierce v. Soc. Of Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925) (state cannot compel students to 
attend public school); Wisonsin v. Yoder, 406 US 205 (1972) (state cannot compel Amish children to go to 
school after 8th grade)., but see Prince v. Mass., 321 US 1258 (1944) (state can prohibit child from selling 
newspapers on a street corner, even if accompanied by a parent); See generally, Gilles, surpa note 99 at 
941-42 (children benefit from the non-neutral, value-laden nurturance  that unregulated parents are free to 
provide). .     
179 See Pierce, 268 US at 535 (“fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union 
repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to  accept 
instruction from public teachers only”);  Yoder, 406 US at 232 (the “primary role of the parents in the 
upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate,”  in part because “history and culture of 
Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their 
children.”)   
180 Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values:  The Role of the State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 
1348, 1371-72 (1994)  (“For children, civil freedom brings nothing less than the right to grow into moral 
autonomy, because the child-citizen . . . flowers to moral independence only under authority that is flexible 
in ways that states . . . cannot manage, and temporary in ways that states . . . cannot tolerate.”    
 33
vis their own children, make decisions on behalf of them,181 then increased state support 
for children need not necessarily lead to more state oversight of parenthood.  If the 
government was willing to spend money on children without setting up an apparatus to 
make sure that the money was spent appropriately, then parenting could remain a private 
right for the middle and upper class and could become a private right for the poor parents 
who currently suffer from very intrusive state monitoring. 182      
 
Thus, in theory, it is possible to separate out obligations for children from rights to 
children. It is possible to give the state more responsibility for financing children without 
giving the state more of a right to raise children, but this would require a strong re-
invigoration of parental autonomy doctrine and a clear understanding of the reasons why 
such a doctrine served children’s interests.  In short, if the plight of poor children compel 
making obligations to children more of a public responsibility, then it is likely that the 
parents will lose much of the autonomy that they now enjoy, unless they are willing to 
champion a strong child-centered parental autonomy doctrine that applies to rich and 
poor alike.183    
   
B. Functional Parenthood  
  
If poor children and their advocates question the advantages of keeping responsibility for 
children a private obligation, another constituency of children and their advocates 
question the advantages of keeping parenthood an exclusive status.  Recall that Part II 
argued that some parents may be attracted to bionormativity precisely because a 
biological norm underscores the exclusivity of parental status.  Only two very specific 
people can ever be the biological parents of a child.  Today, though, an increasing 
number of people are calling on courts to recognize as parents adults who have invested 
time and money and love in children, regardless of whether they have a biological link.  
Many of these functional parents are asking the state to reject the exclusivity of 
bionormativity in order to reward them with rights, and some legal parents are asking the 
state to reject the exclusivity of bionormativity in order to demand that those who have 
enjoyed the status of parent continue to meet parental obligations.   
  
Thousands of children in this country are parented by adults who are not their biological 
parents. A number of studies and emerging caselaw suggest that a remarkably high 
number of children are not biologically related to the man who thinks he is or has acted 
as their father.184   The non-genetic relationships in these family configurations often 
                                                 
181  See Buss,  supra note 130 at 647(parents best suited to make decisions for their children), Appell, supra 
note 176  at 585 (parents know children better than state does)     
182 The support for this state deference would be more powerful in a regime in which all parents received 
support for their children because middle and upper class parents are not likely to have a great deal of 
patience for the social worker who appears at their doorstep asking questions about bedtime and snacks. 
183  Losing parental autonomy vis a vis the state does not necessarily mean that parents will lose their 
exclusive status vis a vis other adults. More state support of children may give the state more of a right to 
monitor children, but it does not give third parties more of a claim to children.  Parenthood can stay an 
exclusive status even with increased state support.  
184  S. Macintyre & A Sooman, Non-paternity and Prenatal Genetic Screening, 338 LANCET 869 (Oct. 5, 
1991) (discussing various studies that suggest non-paternity rates [rates at which the biological father of the 
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present very sympathetic claims for legal recognition, as do the scores of relationships in 
blended families.  Almost 5 million children live with a step-parent and another 2.1 
million live in households in which one of their biological or adoptive parents cohabits 
with another adult.  Another 2 million children live with a relative who is not a parent.  
The non-parent adults in these children’s lives often want parental rights.   
  
A variety of doctrines have grown up to allow non-related parents to acquire some 
parental rights.  Under the equitable parent doctrine, courts often estop a legal parent 
from denying the parental status of someone who has acted as a parent and developed 
emotional ties with the child.185  Courts also compel non-biological fathers on whom 
children have acted as fathers and on whom children have relied to fulfill the legal 
obligations of parent.186  In states that do not allow second parent adoption187 and even in 
some states that do, gay and lesbian parents rely on notions of equitable or de facto 
parenthood if they are to secure custody or visitation rights to children that they have 
helped support and raise.188  Some states do not explicitly endorse either equitable or de 
facto parent theories, but nonetheless allow adults who have formed parent-like bonds to 
sue for visitation.189   In recognition of and sympathy for this line of cases, the American 
Law Institute’s recently adopted Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution 
acknowledge rights of both non-biological equitable parents (who are given relationships 
rights equivalent to legal parents) and non-biological de facto parents (who are given 
somewhat lesser, but still substantial visitation rights).190    
  
For some time, scholars have endorsed this less exclusive approach to parenthood in 
order to recognize and honor the variety of rich and important connections that children 
                                                                                                                                                 
child is not the husband or current partner of the mother]  are anywhere between 5 – 20%.  10% is the most 
commonly used figure, though, the authors suggest, this is probably high).  Traditionally, this was not a 
troublesome legal issue because the husband of the mother was automatically considered the father of the 
child.   For cases see Gallagher v. Gallagher, 539 NW2d 479 (Iowa 1995) (husband not the father of child 
he thought was his); Markov v. Markov, 758 A.2d 75, (Md. 2000)  (husband not the father of twins he had 
thought were his own);  In re Cheryl, 746 NE2d 488 (2001) (man who had been paying child support for 
over 10 years because he thought he was the biological father, found out that he was not).   
185 See Pettinato v. Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909 (R.I. 1990) (mother estopped from challenging paternity in 
divorce proceedings when she originally told husband that he was the father and let him act as father);  Jean 
Maby H. v. Joseph H., 67 NYS.2d 677 (App. Div. 1998)  (mother estopped from denying paternity of 
husband when both husband and wife know all along that he was not the biological father but nonetheless 
held the husband out to the child and the world as the child’s father);  In re Gallagher, 539 NW2d 479, 482 
(Iowa 1995) (wife estopped from denying husband’s paternity when she concealed fact that he was not the 
biological father from him).   
186  See cases cited supra note 78. 
187 Second-parent adoption is the term of art for adoption by a second parent of the same gender. See 
Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003).    
188  Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 968 (R.I. 2000) (lesbian co-parent’s right to visitation based on de 
facto parent relationship); A.C. vg. C.B. 829, P.2d 660 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992 (agreement with biological 
mother unenforceable, but lesbian co-parent can seek visitation based on her relationship with child).  
189 Simpson v. Simpson, 586 SW2d 33 (Ky. 1979) (step-mother who lived with child from 17 months to 
age 6 months deserves opportunity to show that visitation would be in child’s best interest);  Holtzman v. 
Knott, 533 NW12d 419, 435-36 Wis. 1995)  (visitation appropriate if adult and child lived together in the 
same household and  established a parent-child like bond  with the biological parent’s consent).   
190 See PRINCIPLES supra note 77, §§2.03(1)(b) and 2.03(1)(c). 
 35
develop with adults.191  Recognizing these relationships also rewards adults who, in some 
sense, seem to have earned parental status.  These calls to recognize more people as 
parents, though, necessarily call for a  rejection of traditional parental autonomy.  There 
is no way to pass judgment on these new relationships and at the same time honor the 
parental prerogatives that the Constitution has previously protected.  The only reason 
non-legal parents are in court is because a legal parent does not want them to enjoy the 
kind of access to the child that the non-legal parent wants.192 In order to assess whether a 
non-legal parent should be granted legal rights, judges must make qualitative assessments 
of emotional investment and connection and commitment.  The extant parents are not free 
to bring up children “in the way they should go,” nor do they have the “right coupled 
with the high duty” to raise their children if it is the state’s job to determine parental 
status or parental rights based on who has done a sufficiently good job of developing a 
legally cognizable emotional connection with a child.  In giving legal status to these 
relationships, courts, thus, at once, make parenthood less private, less exclusive, less 
biological and less binary.     
   
C. DG Families  
 
A wholly different group of people, one that is probably perfectly content with the notion 
of private and exclusive parenting, but who use donated gametes to produce children that 
they want to parent, is putting pressure on the biological dimensions of bionormativity.  
To a certain extent, adoption law has always put pressure on the biological dimensions of 
bionormativity, but adoption was always something of a special case.  For the most part, 
adoption has been viewed as a necessary, next-best solution, not an equal to biological 
parenthood.193   The law has never been fully comfortable ignoring adoptees biological 
origins,194 and adoption was seen as the answer to a situation in which both the biological 
parents failed (by producing a child that they did not want or could not rear) and the 
adoptive parents failed (by not being able to produce a child).195     In contrast, the 
biological parents of children born through gamete donation have often not failed at 
anything and the ultimate parents of DG children often prefer, from the outset, not to 
produce a child the traditional way.  Adoptive parents are seen as sympathetic but 
normative because of their desire but inability to produce biologically; DG parents are 
seen as non-normative because of their desire to circumvent the traditional biological 
process.  
 
                                                 
191   Bartlett, supra note 98 (examining why thinking of parenthood as exclusive does not reflect reality for 
many families) ; Bartlett, supra note 108 293 (1988) (suggesting that parenthood should not be thought of 
in terms of parental possessiveness or self-centeredness);   Naomi Cahn, Reframing Child Custody 
Decision-Making 58 OHIO ST. L. J. 1 (1997) (advocating the designation of a variety of  adults as parents). 
192 If the legal parent wanted to share parental rights with a non-parent he or she could simply do so without 
any court interference.  
193 See generally, Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing, 52 DUKE L. J. 1077 (2003) (both 
intestacy and incest laws treated adoptees differently than other children).  It’s important to remember too, 
of course, that the law did not treat all biological children the same either.  Who one’s mother was married 
to had much more to do with one’s parentage than did who one’s biological father was.  
194 Id. at 1138. 
195 See supra note 151 (adoption is not the first choice of any of the triad).  
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The way in which DG parents circumvent the traditional biological process is also 
unnerving to some.  For the most part, they use something like a contract to produce a 
child.  Most people who donate gametes for others to use or who use gametes that others 
have donated, sign some form of document delineating who shall be considered parents 
of the child. A donor who leaves his sperm with a sperm bank signs a document 
absolving himself of rights and obligations with regard to any child produced with his 
sperm.196  Egg donors sign similar documents.  Surrogate mothers who become pregnant 
with donated genetic material from others also sign contracts in which their rights as 
parents are terminated.  Although there is some controversy over whether courts enforce 
these contracts as signed or look more carefully (than traditional contract doctrine would 
require) at the intent of the parties,197 there is agreement that the preconception intent of 
the parties is critical to the determination of who ultimately retains parental rights and 
responsibilities.198  The standard for determining parentage in cases without explicit 
elaboration of the future rights and obligations of the parties is also often one of  
preconception intent.199   Thus, whether a woman goes to a sperm bank or gets in 
informal donation from a friend, whether a man uses his spouse’s eggs to impregnate a 
surrogate or uses donated eggs to impregnate his spouse, courts will usually determine 
parentage not based on who contributed to the child’s genetic make-up, but who intended 
to parent the child.200  An intent standard also makes true single parenthood possible.  
One woman or one man can acquire the necessary reproductive material and services 
with the intention of parenting alone. 
  
By itself, a parental regime based on intent to parent is perfectly coherent.  The law 
grants parental rights and responsibilities to those who caused a child to come into being 
with the intent of parenting that child once it was born.  The problem, of course, is that 
the system is wholly inconsistent with bionormativity and paternity doctrine, the purposes 
of which are and always have been to make men who did not intend to parent, parents.   
Preconception contracts allocating parental status for babies conceived through 
conventional reproductive activities have always been void.201   We have never let men 
and women agree to waive parental status before or after the intercourse that can lead to 
conception.202   Indeed, paternity doctrine makes men who are incapable of consenting to 
sex liable for child support and it makes men who were the victims of misprepresentation 
                                                 
196  Most states also have statutes that terminate any parental rights or responsibility that a sperm donor 
might have, see e.g., UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (“donor is not a parent of a child conceived  by 
means of assisted reproduction.”).   
197 Compare, Baker, supra note 80 at 26-30 (arguing that courts let contract govern in reproductive 
technology cases) with JANET DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY:  LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND REPRODUCTION IN 
AN UNEASY AGE 180-81 (1997) (arguing that courts look to intent, not contract because of their discomfort 
with contract rhetoric in the family setting).   
198 Id.   
199 See R.C. v.  J.R. , 775 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1989) (reviewing the commentary and caselaw and concluding 
the preconception intent is the appropriate standard). 
200 But see, JF v. DB, 66 Pa D & CV 4th 1 (2004) (rejecting the intent standard). 
201 Budnick v. Silverman, 805 So.2d 1112, 1113 (Fla. Dist. App. 2002) (“rights of support and meaningful 
relationship belong to the child, not the parent; therefore neither parent can bargain away those rights”); 
Ferguson v. McKiernan, 60 D & C 4th 353 (Dauphin Cty 2002) (oral contract between parties in which 
biological mother agreed to release biological father from child support obligation void).  
202 See, Baker, supra note  80 at  11-12. 
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of fraud (with regard to birth control) parents.203    Inquiries into intent to be a parent thus 
have everything to do with the parentage of DG children and nothing to do with the 
parentage of children conceived through sexual intercourse. 
 
The receptivity to the intent-based regime for DG children may not be surprising, though, 
if one views the overriding concern of bionormativity as securing adequate resources for 
children.  Most of the people intending to create a child using reproductive technologies 
(like most people who adopt children) have the resources to provide for the child. After 
all, one needs resources to buy gametes and, in many instances, health care services.  So 
the exigency that arguably made paternity doctrine necessary in the first place is not 
present.  If the state does not need the biological parent’s money, it may care less about 
biological connection.   
 
Most of these reproductive technology contracts also draw a complete parentage picture.  
As long as a court enforces the contract – or the preconception intent of the parties – it is 
not called on to determine who will make the best or most appropriate parent; the parties 
themselves decided that.  To the extent that the state would rather steer clear of making 
parentage determinations, enforcing these contracts allows it to do so.   
  
Thus, there is much about the allocation of rights and responsibilities in these 
reproductive agreements that conforms to the bionormative  construction of parenthood – 
parenthood is a private, exclusive arrangement that brings with it full financial 
responsibility for children.   As long as one doesn’t ask too many questions about the 
origins of the child, DG families fit very neatly into the traditional bionormative 
construction of parenthood. And DG parents clearly benefit from the privacy and 
exclusivity associated with bionormativity.   It has been the private provision of health 
care services that has allowed the reproductive technology business to thrive,204 and 
precisely because there are others with a biological link to their children, this group 
probably feels very strongly that parenthood should not be a flexible or temporal status.  
The more permanent and fixed their status as parents, the less they have to worry about 
others encroaching on their rights.   
 
The extent to which a parental regime based on intent must be a binary regime is 
somewhat controversial.  As suggested, single women (and occasionally single men) can 
                                                 
203  County of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel T. , 57 Cal Rptr 2d 843 (Ct. App. 1996); ex rel. Hermesmann 
v. Seyer, 847 P2d 1273 (Kan 1993); Mercer Cty Dept. of Soc. Serv. V. Alf M. 589 NYS2d 288, 289  (NY 
Fam Ct. 1992) (all holding that an inability to give meaningful consent to sexual activity does not void any 
child support obligation that flows from that sexual activity);  Wallis v. Smith, 22 P3d 682, 686 (NM 
2001); Pamela P. v. Frank S. 449, NE2d 713, 715 (NY 1983); Moorman v. Walker, 773 P2d 887, 889 
(Wash Ct. App 1989)  (all holding that potentially deceitful behavior by a woman before or during sexual 
activity does not void the child support obligation).   
204 Most European countries have much more regulation of reproductive technological services, in part 
because the vast majority of medical services are provided by the state. Among other things, this means that 
many European states refuse to allow single mothers or gay parents to access reproductive technologies.   
See Nancy Polikoff, Recognizing Partners but not Parents / Recognizing Paretns but not Partners:  Gay 
and Lesbian Family Law in Europe and in the United, 17 NYL Sch. J. Hum Rts. 711,716 (2001) 
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intend to parent alone.205  Some state courts have made clear that single women using 
donated sperm should not be subject to any kind of interference suit by the donor if she 
intended to parent alone.206   On the other hand, courts often resist finding only one 
parent,207 and at least one commentator has written that the law should not validate any 
reproductive arrangement that contemplates only one parent for a child.  Marsha Garrison 
argues that because it is important for children to have two parents, single men and 
women should not be able to contract for genetic material unless there is another adult 
(either the donate provider or someone else) willing to assume full parental duties.208  If 
no other adult is named, Garrison would make the gamete donor a parent.   
 
Garrison’s proposal suggests that the use of donated gametes does not necessarily 
undermine a notion of binary parenting.  An intent standard by itself legitimates the 
notion of single parenthood, but the law could override that conceptualization of 
parenthood if binariness itself is considered important.  In other words, the state can 
impose a binary requirement even as it allows people to buy gametes for reproductive 
purposes.  Thus, deliberately subverting biological reproduction does not actually 
undermine most of the core attributes of bionormativity.  A system that incorporates the 




At this point, we can design a table that helps synthesize the analysis presented thus far.  
The interests of the constituencies that were discussed in Part II are outlined in Table 1, 
Rows 1-3.  The interests of the constituencies that have been discussed in Part III are 
outlined in Rows 4-6.  A “Y” indicates that a given constituency (Rows 1-6) have an 
interest in the attribute (columns A-D) listed in the column.   An “N” indicates that a 
constituency is hurt by the given attribute.  A “N/Y” suggest that he constituency may be 
split in its interest of a given attribute.  A “∅” indicates that the constituency is neutral as 
to the attribute. 
                                                 
205 Valerie s. Mannis, Single Mothers by Choice, 48 FAM. REL 121 (1999) (women often choose to parent 
alone); Jane D. Bock, Doing the Right Thing?  Single Mothers by Choice and the Struggle for Legitimacy, 
14 GENDER AND SOC. 1 (2000) (“In 1990 alone, more than 170,000 single women odler than 30 gave birth,.  
Among whilte womena dn women who attended college, the percentage who became mtoehrs without 
marrying more than doubled during the 1980s; for women with professional or managerial jobs, it nearly 
tripled”); Jennifer Egan, Wanted A Few Good Sperm, NY TIMES MAG. , 3/19/06 (interviews with single 
women by choice).  
206  Calif. In Jhordan C v. Mary K, 179 Cal App 3d 386, 392 (Cal. Ct. App 1986)  (“The California 
Legislature has afforded unmarried as well as married women a statutory vehicle for obtaining semen for 
artificial insemination without fear that the donor may claim paternity . . . “) In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35 
(“an unmarried woman does not lose the protection of the artificial insemination statute simply because she 
knows the donor . . . “) . 
207 See JF v. DB, 66 Pa D & CV 4th 1 (2004) (assigning parental rights to gestational mother and 
sperm/donor intending father because child needs two parents); Jhordan C., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 396 
(finding, against mother’s wishes, that the  sperm donor may  have intended to be a parent);  Jf v. DB, 66 
Pa D & C 4th (finding  gestational surrogate to be the mother because the surrogacy contract did not 
otherwise provide for a legal mother);  Monmouth Cty. Div. of Soc. Serv. V. RK, 757 A.2d 319, 327 (NJ 
Super Ct. Chanc Div. 200) (non-biological father held responsible because biological father could not be 
located). `  
208 Garrison, supra, note 133 at 902.   
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Table 1 
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Private  
(no state $;  no 














    State 
              Y           Y          Y         ∅ 
2. Traditional 
     Parents   
          Y           Y          Y*          Y 
3. Traditional 
   Children 
          Y                         N/Y          N          Y(?) 
4.  Poor Parents 
     And        
Children 
          N**           Y          N          Y 
5. Step or Other 
    Functional  
     Families 
          N           N          N          N 
6.  DG Families           Y           Y          Y          N 
 
* If parents can assume state support of their children, their interest in binary, as opposed to unitary, 
parenthood diminishes.  If a parent can be assured of some state help in the financial cost of raising a child, they might 
prefer to have their parental rights be exclusive.  But, state support would likely also mean more state intrusion, so 
parents might well prefer a binary regime that keeps parenthood private and includes two potential sources of support.  
 ** Unlike most parents who prefer a conceptualization of parenthood as private so that their parental 
autonomy is protected, poor parents have little lose in terms of parental autonomy (their rights are already limited) and 
much to gain from greater state support of children.   If, however, an increase in state funding was accompanied by a  
strong, child-centered defense of parental rights, the square should have a N/Y, indicating that support could be public, 
while parents were still given privacy to parent as they chose. 
 
 
Table 1 brings some important conclusions into relief.  First, the number of Ys scattered 
throughout the chart, but particularly in the fist three rows, suggests that many people 
benefit from the qualities associated with a bionormative regime.  Second, the string of 
“Ns” in row 5 makes clear that the practice that is most inconsistent with the core 
attributes of bionormativity is not substituting state responsibility for parental 
responsibility (row 4) or substituting one person’s genes for another (row 6), but giving 
legal recognition to the relationships that, in fact, define children’s lives.  Indeed, the 
practice that one might suspect of being most at odds with a bionormative regime, that is, 
a practice of purposively substituting biological contributions (row 6), seems to threaten 
the core attributes of bionormativity very little.  Meanwhile, more state support of 
children (row 4), while it undermines the private construction of parenthood and its 
essential binariness, is perfectly consistent with a regime that limits the number of people 
who can be parents to any one child and with a regime that still  puts a premium on 






E.  Policy Implications 
 
Below is a discussion of the consequences that are likely to flow from the different policy 
decisions that might be implemented in response to the pressure currently being but on 
bionormativity.  Lest there be any doubt, allegiance to the various different attributes of 
bionormativity does not break down on conventional political lines.  Consider how 
different people traditionally found on the Left might view the importance of parental 
privacy. The last thing a middle class lesbian mother wants is a parental regime in which 
children are seen as public goods so that here home life is subject to public regulation. A 
poor woman on welfare is probably much more interested in seeing all children viewed as 
a public responsibility because she needs more financial help and her parenting practicing 
are already subject to regulation.  By the same token, consider how people traditionally 
found on the Right might view the importance of biology.   Some conservatives might 
would to insist on downplaying the importance of biology because they see the marital 
family and not the biological one as what will best hold society together. Other 
conservatives might advocate a strict biological regime so as to curb potentially reckless 
male behavior, minimize state support and discourage scientific tinkering with God’s 
design.  Comparably someone eager to legitimate gay families may be enthusiastic about 
a binary requirement for parenthood because a binary rule makes it more likely that a 
non-biologically related partner/parent will retain legal status.209  Single parents eager to 
be able to parent on their own may have little patience for a binary requirement. 
 
 
1. State Support 
 
If, like the traditional state (Row 1), one’s primary concern is in making sure that the 
United States does not adopt the kind of child welfare systems that operate elsewhere, 
then one must be wary of the extent to which one endorses any state regulation of 
parenthood and one must be wary of granting third party rights.  The more the state is 
involved in regulating parental decision-making and the more it is involved in allocating 
rights between interested adults, the less legitimate is the claim that the relationship 
between parent and child is a private one and that the state has no obligation to support 
children financially.  
 
On the other hand, if one is primarily concerned with getting more state money to 
children, particularly poor children, then Box 4A indicates that one must be prepared for 
a likely increase in state regulation of  parental behavior.   State regulation of parental 
                                                 
209 The gay rights organizations that have played a role in disputes between biologically–related and non-
biologically related gay parents almost uniformly argue on behalf of the non-biologically related gay 
parent.   As one top gay family advocate explained, “our families are foreclosed from legal respect in most 
places, and we think it breeds further disrespect for our families hen one of the parties takes the position 
that there is a biological trump card. . . . “  E-mail from Mary Bonauto, Civil Rights Project Director, 
GLAD, 2/23/07 (on file with author); see also William Rubenstein, Divided We Propogate:  An 
introduction to Protecting Families: Standards for Chidl Custody in Same Sex Relationships, 10 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L. J. 143, 144-45 (1999) (discussing ethical standards for gay organizations representing gay 
parents in custody disputes).  
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behavior does not necessarily lead to a greater acceptance of third party claims, however 
(Box 4B).  State support may give the state a greater claim to an interest in how a child is 
parented, but it does not give third parties’ a greater interest.  As indicated, it is also 
possible to claim that children are entitled to more money from the state without 
accepting greater state oversight, if one is prepared to make a strong child-centered 
defense of parental autonomy.  (See ** in Box 4A). With that regime, though, would 
almost certainly come a less binary approach to parenthood because deference to parents 
in an age of many divorced and separated parents means the state must prioritize parents 
and choose which parent it will defer to.   
 
State support of children would also diminish the need for a second source of support and 
thus diminish the need for paternity doctrine.  A decreased reliance on paternity doctrine 
would, in turn, have implications for our general allegiance to biology (and thus our 
approach to gamete donation) because there would be less need to rely on biology in 
order to establish parental status in unwilling parents.  In sum, more state funding of 
children would likely lead to a less binary approach to parenthood whether it was 
accompanied by a strong or weak parental rights doctrine and it would likely diminish 
our allegiance to mandatory parenthood for biological parents.  
 
 
2.  Functional Parenthood   
 
If one is concerned with giving legal recognition to the variety of relationships that 
children experience as important, then one may need to dispense with most of the core 
elements of bionormativity.  There is much to be said in favor of recognizing functional 
parenthood,210 but as Column B suggests, many people have an interest in parenthood as 
an exclusive status.  All of the child-centered arguments that favor a strong parental 
autonomy doctrine,211 disfavor a more functional approach to parenthood because the 
more the state is involved in dispensing parental rights to others, the more the state is 
involved in orchestrating a child’s life.  The more people who claim a right to rear a 
child, the less coherent and unified a child’s sense of belonging is likely to be. The more 
people who have rights with regard to a child, the more likely that the child will be the 
subject of litigation battles – the consequences of which are notoriously bad for 
children.212     
 
There is also a certain asymmetry in expanding parenthood in this manner.  As I have 
argued elsewhere, there seems to be much greater affinity for expanding the rights of 
                                                 
210 See Bartlett, supra notes 99 and 109; Cahn, supra note 191.   
211 See supra text accompanying notes  126-130.  
212 See Janet Johnston, High-Conflict Divorce, in FUTURE CHILDREN, Spring 1994 at 172, 175 (Children of 
high conflict divorce two to four times more likely to be clinically disturbed); MClanahan et al, Child-
support Enforcement and Child Well-Being, supra note  at 254 (increased conflict associated with 
collecting child support from never-married fathers may increase dangerous stress enough to outweigh 
benefits of money)  
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third parties than expanding the obligations of third parties.213  What the increasing 
recognition of functional parenthood seems to be creating, in other words, is not just a 
regime that contemplates more parents, but a regime that contemplates different levels of 
parenthood, greater and lesser parenthood.    Some parents have rights and obligations; 
other parents just have rights.214  To the extent we are willing to accept greater and lesser 
degrees of parenthood, we need to question the trends elsewhere in family law to treat all 
parents as equal.   Arguments for joint custody,215 arguments against the labels of 
“custody” and “visitation” (precisely because they suggests a hierarchy),216 and much of 
the rhetoric from Father’s Rights groups,217 reject  a notion of hierarchical parenthood.   
It is important to recognize, therefore, that a movement to recognize more parents – 
which is almost certainly a movement to recognize different classes of parents - exists in 
some tension with movements to equalize parental status.  
 
Recognizing functional parenthood also has clear implications for other core attributes of 
a bionormative regime.  Because the process of recognizing functional parents requires 
court intervention, parenthood becomes less private. This makes arguments against state 
funding less compelling and thus makes state funding more likely.  More state funding 
leads to the consequences just discussed, less binary parenthood, lesser need for paternity 
doctrine, potential degrees of parenthood.  Recognizing functional relationships also 
clearly makes parenthood less biological and that has implications for the question of 
what kind of regime should govern for children born with donated gametes.    
 
 
3. Binary Parenthood 
 
As discussed, Marsha Garrison has made the case for binary parenthood.  Garrison argues 
that children are better served by a regime that insists on two parents.  She would thus 
prohibit the current practice of single adults acquiring genetic material from a bank or 
some other party and parenting alone.  Nothing in Garrison’s argument precludes an 
expansion of parental rights beyond two people, but a strong belief in two does weaken 
                                                 
213 Katharine K. Baker, Assymetric Parenthood, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY 121 (Wilson ed. 2006) 
(critiquing ALI’s liberal approach to granting rights to non-traditional parents with its reluctance to hold 
non-traditional parents responsible for child support).  
214  The European approach to paternity, discussed briefly in Part II, actually reflects an opposite scheme, 
one in which some parents (particularly fathers) have some obligation, but very limited rights.  See 
generally, Williams, supra note 83 (comparing the relative paternal rights and paternity establishment rates 
in the United States, Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany).    Some scholars in this country have also 
suggested this approach,  Karen Czapanskiy,  Volunteers and Draftees:  The Struggle for Parental 
Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415 (1991) (fathers should have responsibilities without necessarily having 
rights). 
215 See June Carbone, The Missing Piece of the Custody Puzzle:  Creating a New Model of Parental 
Partnership, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV 1091, 1110-13  (1995) (after it was first adopted in California in 
1979, joint custody spread rapidly, though its popularity has waned in recent years).  
216  See ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 77, § 203 cmt. e (replacing traditional custody and visitation language 
in order to “avoid the win-lose conceptualization”).   
217  See Mathew Bowers, Fathers Fight Back, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR, June 6, 1995 at EI 
(fathers role should be more than just “sending a monthly check”); Chris Sturgis, Fathers Group Pushes for 
Shared Role, TIME UNION (Albany, NY) Oct. 27, 1996 at C6 (quoting president of Father’s Rights’ Society 
saying “father should be more than a paycheck”).  
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the argument for governmental support of children because two parents provide two 
sources of income.  In essence, she argues that the financial incentives that encouraged 
states to insist on two parents inure to children’s psychological benefit.   Children’s 
emotional needs and the state’s bottom line are both served by insisting on two parents.   
 
Requiring two parents in a world with non-monogamous living patterns and readily 
available genetic material will put pressure on the idea of equal parenthood, however. 
When we compel an unwilling person to be a parent or force a person who wants to 
parent alone to name a co-parent, we are likely, again, to endorse a parental regime in 
which there are degrees of parenthood.   There will be one parent who does the 
overwhelming amount of parental work and who is likely, therefore, to be afforded more 
parental rights.  Children in these situations will experience their second parent  as many 
children of “single mothers” do today, a person who is known to exist and might play a 
marginal role in the child’s support, but does not play a significant emotional, financial or 
physical role in the child’s life.218    
 
In analyzing the recent history of child custody, David Meyer has posited that we have 
seen the pendulum swing from the “old” regime in which non-custodial parents (usually 
fathers) were clearly considered lesser parents,219 to a belief that parental rights and 
responsibilities should be equally shared,220 and now maybe a bit back again (at least for 
constitutional purposes) to a regime in which non-custodial parents have decidedly fewer 
parental rights.221  There may be nothing wrong with this unequal treatment of parents.    
In some ways it reflects what some feminist family law scholars have advocated when 
they call for greater legal recognition of the obvious social fact that women do the vast 
amount of caretaking work.222    It also reflects the stability values that Freud, Goldstein 
and Solnit emphasized years ago when they encouraged courts to award custody to the 
one real psychological parent.223     
 
Recognizing one parent as primary when there are other parents has costs though.  It 
legitimates the idea of degrees of parenthood and thereby makes it harder for everyone to 
view parenthood as an equally shared enterprise. This hinders the efforts of other feminist 
reformers who yearn for men and women to share parenting work more equally,224 and it 
                                                 
218  See R. Emery, R. Otto and W. O’Donohue, A Critical Assessment of Child Custody Evaluations:  
Limited Science and a  Flawed System, 6 PSYCH. SCI IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 1, 15 (2005)  (in “an analysis 
of the 1998 US Census data, 40% of nonresident fathers and 22% of nonresident mothers had had no 
contact with their children in the previous year.  Among the 60% of nonresident fathers who had seen their 
children, contact occurred on an average of 69 days per year.”)  
219 David Meyer, The Constitutional Rights of Non-Custodial Parents, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1461, 1470 
(2006). 
220 Id. at 1472-74 
221 Id. at 1480- 1483 (discussing Elk Grove Village v. Newdow 542 US 1 (2004); Brittain v. Hansen, 451 
F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2006); Crowly v. McKinney, 400 F3d 965 (7th Cir. 2005).  
222  See Fineman, supra note 125 (advocating a mother-child dyad as the critical family relationship worthy 
of state recognition); Becker, supra  note 156 at 142-53 (1992) (advocating preference  for maternal 
custody). I say ironically because it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court in Newdow or Judge Posner in 
Crowley endorsed mother’s greater rights in the name of feminism.  
223 GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD (1973). 
224 See WILLIAMS,  supra   note 156.  
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hinders the efforts of non-custodial parents who yearn to play a more significant role in 
their children’s lives.  One could have a regime in which parents who invested unequally 
were treated unequally and parents who invested equally were treated equally, but 
determining the equality of parental investment is notoriously difficult.  Different parents 
parent in different ways and invest in different ways.  The very existence of second-class 
parenthood makes it harder for people who want equal treatment because they will likely 
have to prove that they are equal.  Enforcing a binary requirement increases the number 
of unwilling and reluctant parents and therefore increases the number of unequal 
parenting arrangements. It thus probably clearly does damage to a presumption of equal 
parenting.   
   
4. Biology 
 
Finally, if one is moved by the arguments in Part IIC that children benefit from being 
raised by biological parents, then one must turn one’s attention to Table 1, Column D.  
Boxes 5D and 6D suggest that if biology is a real concern, then one must be wary of 
granting third party rights to non-biological parents and one must be wary of allowing 
any donation of gametes.  If children really are best served by being raised by biological 
parents then perhaps we should ban not only anonymous gamete donation,225 but all 
gamete donation.  A ban on gamete donation, in the name of protecting biological links, 
would be perfectly consistent with and might even countenance greater state support for 
children.  If one thinks that parenthood really should, if at all possible, be defined by a 
biological connection, then one probably would endorse greater state support of children 
because greater state support makes it more likely that poor parents have access to the 
resources necessary to raise their children.  
 
The data with regard to the importance of biology is far from clear, however.226  If one 
rejects the importance of biology completely, one can readily accept not only gamete 
donation but anonymous gamete donation.227  If, instead, one would prefer to hedge one’s 
bets and make biology relevant though not necessarily primary, then a solution might lie, 
as it appears to elsewhere, in degrees of parenthood.228   Gamete donation would be 
permissible as long as children produced with donated gametes had access to their 
donees. If children can avoid the feelings of abandonment and isolation discussed in Part 
IIC by simply knowing and having some access to the people who gave them their 
genetic material, then, again, what we may  need is a more fluid understanding of 
                                                 
225  See countries that are doing so, supra note 146-148.  
226 Hence, the (?) in Box 3D.  
227 If one endorses a regime in which gamete donors can relinquish all parental rights and responsibilities, 
one must still come to terms with paternity doctrine.  To date, we still do not have an answer for why it is 
permissible to walk away from a sperm bank when it is not permissible to walk away from a one night 
stand.  See supra text accompanying notes 201-204     .  
228 Lousiana may already be moving in this direction. It appears to be the one state that has recognized that 
a child can have two fathers, one, the marital father who is primarily responsible for child support, and a 
biological father who can act as a guarantor for support and whose identity is known to the child.  See 
Smith v. Cole, 553 So.2d 847, 855  (La. 1989).  For greater discussion of Louisiana law see Carbone, supra 
note 138 at 1342-43; Note, State Ex Rel Wilson v. Wilson:  Determining the Proper Payor of Child Support 
in the Context of Dual Paternity, 51 Loy. L. Rev. 203, 211-216 (2005). .   
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parenthood, one that involves a variety of adults who may have different levels of rights 
and responsibilities.  A genetic parent would not likely be responsible for child support, 
but might have some form of visitation rights. This is a construction of parenthood that 
looks very much like the world of parenthood that is emerging to meet the needs of 
functional families, discussed above (Table 3, Row 5):  Parenthood as a non-exclusive 
status, that often involves multiple adults with different rights and responsibilities and 




* * * 
 
 
The arguments against this more fluid construction of parenthood are the arguments for 
exclusivity and privacy (Columns A and B) and the arguments for equal parenting.  If 
children really do benefit from strong parental rights and a limited number of adults who 
claim a role in rearing them; if children are hurt when a Big Brother State starts dictating 
parenting practices, if many mothers and fathers would prefer a world in which the 
obligations of parenthood were shared equally, then the benefits of constructing a more 
fluid understanding of parenthood may not be worth the costs.  Moreover, if parents 
really benefit from having the confidence and assurance that their parenting is not subject 
to second-guessing then there is real danger in creating new classes of parents with 
different rights and responsibilities. Policymakers must decide whether the importance of 
genetic connection trumps the advantages of privacy and exclusivity, just as they must 
decide whether the importance of established relationship trumps the advantages of 
privacy and exclusion. In doing so, they must be careful to be collaterally consistent.  A 
regime that favors the exclusive rights of intended parents who used donated gametes 
should probably not simultaneously champion a functional parenthood approach because 
functional parenthood assessments severely undermine parental privacy and exclusivity.  
Comparably, if one believes that children must be granted rights of access to their genetic 
parents, one must be prepared to embrace other forms of multiple parenthood. If one 
accepts multiple parenthood with the recognition that there will be greater and lesser 
forms of parenthood, one must reject the presumption of equal parenthood in more 
traditional divorce contexts as well.  
 
 












IV.  Conclusion 
 
 
The analysis presented here makes clear that legal parenthood need not be synonymous 
with biological parenthood. It has not been historically and it need not be ethically.  A 
biological regime still holds many attractions though, not just because biological 
connection itself may be an appealing basis for parenthood, but because of the way in 
which a biological regime constructs parenthood as a private, exclusive and binary 
enterprise.  This paper has evaluated how these core attributes of biological parenthood 
are threatened by contemporary parenting practices.  Two conclusions and a host of 
normative questions emerge. 
 
First, it is the erosion of exclusive parenthood that poses the greatest threat to the totality 
of attributes that we associate with biological parenthood.  As Diagram 1 makes clear, 
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recognizing functional, non-exclusive parenthood undermines all of the core qualities 
associated with biological parenthood.  Ironically, given how transformative the idea of 
non-exclusive parenthood may be, it has not been particularly controversial.229   Few 
people decry the recognition of grandparent and step-parent rights as corrosive of the 
family, yet the expansion of parental rights clearly does undermine biological norms.  In 
contrast, contemporary family practices, like single parenting and test-tube babies, that 
are often portrayed as severely undermining the modern family, pose relatively little 
threat to much of what makes bionormativity attractive.   
 
The relative lack of controversy surrounding non-exclusive parenthood could stem from 
what, in retrospect, seems like a soemwhat obvious observation:  as adults cease to live 
monogamous and stable lives, conceptualizations of parenthood grow less binary and 
more fluid.  But, of course, biology is binary and fixed.  The movement we see toward a 
greater number of parents and degrees of parenthood may suggest that the traditional 
marital presumption did not necessarily act as a proxy for biology so much as it acted as a 
proxy for adult-child relationship. The married people in a child’s household were the 
ones most likely to have an important, legally cognizable relationship with that child.  
The less stable marriage is, the less able it is to serve as a proxy for either biology or 
important relationship.  Still, that leaves us with the question of whether we want 
parenthood to be stable and exclusive. 
 
The second conclusion that emerges from the foregoing analysis is that many roads lead 
to a concept of parenthood that is more inclusive, but also more hierarchical.  A regime 
that makes room for different kinds of legal parents allows adults with different kinds of 
investment – genetic, emotional, financial – to retain some legal rights without 
commanding the kind of authority or responsibility that parents have traditionally 
enjoyed.  In many of these situations, there will be one primary and several ancillary 
parents.  Parenthood will not be viewed as an equal enterprise for the people in it.   A 
regime that accepts the idea that there can be different degrees of parenthood will have an 
easier time relegating a non-custodial parent to second class parental status precisely 
because there will be such thing as second class parental status. 
 
This result is not inevitable, particularly if one is able to identify and endorse those 
attributes of bionormativity that may be worth fighting for in their own right.   
Maintaining allegiance to the notion that parenthood should be private makes it less 
likely that the state will be supporting children and therefore less likely that the state will 
be regulating parenthood and making parental rights more diffuse.  Maintaining 
allegiance to the notion that parenthood should be an exclusive status makes it all but 
impossible for multiple parents to emerge.  Accepting the legitimacy of single parenthood 
decreases the prevalence of unequal parenthood and thus helps sustain a notion of equal 
parenthood.  Maintaining allegiance to biological or genetic connection because it is good 
for children makes men and women’s parental contributions seem equal and precludes 
those who do not contribute biologically from asserting parental status.  .  
 
                                                 
229  All 50 states have some form of third party visitation statute, some just for grandparents, but others for 
third parties generally.  See Buss, supra note 131 at  638. 
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It seems clear that the time has come for the law to choose the relative weight it gives to 
the qualities of parenthood that accompany a bionormative regime.   A premium on 
biology is not mandated by history, evolutionary theory, or morality, but a premium on 
biology does bring with it attributes that may have real value, and different attributes 
have different value for different constituencies.   Contemporary living patterns demand 
some sort of change, but any change will come with costs to some and maybe even costs 
to all.  The policy priorities in this area are not easy or obvious, but they should be 
defined in recognition of the consequences that are likely to follow.  
 
 
